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A Study of Federal Taxation in Times of Emergency. 
I. Introduction: 
Regarding taxation as an integral part in the emergency 
financial scheme: 
(x) A statement of the·ethical questions involved. 
(1) The formula of emergency finance: 
(a) the entire extraol"dinar•y e.xpendi tures should 
11e met by the returns from newly-laid taxation, 
with no permanent increases to the public 
indebtedness; or 
(b) the entire extraordinal"Y e.xpendi tures should 
be met by the returns from loans, with no 
additional taxation beyond that necessary for 
the support of public credit; or 
(c) the entire extraordinary expenditures should 
be met by some combination of the two above-
i!lentioned methods, involving the merits and 
avoiding the demerits of each. 
(x) A statement of the surplus method in emergency. 
(2) Methods of emerGency financiering: 
(a) the ta:~ation policy of financing a war; the 
theol"Y and practise of Gladstona·!s administra-
tion of finance durinG the invasion of the 
Crimea; 
(b) the loan policy of financing a war; the theory 
and practise of Gallatin's administration of 
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finance in the War of 1812; 
(c) the taxation-credit policy of financing a 
war>; the theory and practise of Lloyd-Geo:r>ge's 
and McKenna's administration of finance in 
the present European War. 
(3) Review of al"guments on taxation and credit: 
(a) the tax policy should be adopted for the reasons: 
-that upon the generation engaging in war> 
is imposed, by the ethical precept involved, 
the responsibility of assuming the whole 
economic burden entailed upon the country 
through their desire or acquiescence to par-
ticipate in the destructive practise of 
warfare; 
-that economy and regal"dfulness in time of 
crisis are dependent upon the extent to 
which the people directly feel the burqen. 
of the structure of expenditure which they, 
by their decision, are piling up; 
-that the advocacy and extension of the 
fallacy that the economic burden imposed 
upon a people in time of emergency is light; 
ened by the substitution of a loan policy 
for a tax policy in the meeting of current 
extraordinary expenditures, is an imposition, 
not only on the parties to the situation, 
i' 
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but on the science of public finance; 
-that war taxes may be considered to be 
instruments applicable to the measuring 
and intensifying of patriotism, and should 
be levied to that end, since it is hardly 
to be conceived that a self-governing peo-
ple would undertalce a war they did not 
favor, or which they would not support. 
(b) the credit policy should be adopted for the reasons: 
-that the assumption of liabilities 
against posterity is not to be set down 
as an unrecompensed and unauthorized im-
position of economic burden offensive to 
ethical principles, since modern wars are 
engaged in, not for the advancement of 
the material interests of the present gen-
eration, but in the defense of national 
principles and rights, and yield benefits 
which ar•e not temporary but permanent; 
-that economy and regardfulness to a point 
of restraint against free aggressiveness 
in military and naval programs under a state 
of war are not the qualifications of good 
financial management that they are under 
conditions of peace; that it must he conceded 
that in time of emergency economy ranks 
I' 
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second to adequacy; 
-that whatever truth may be attributed 
to the argument of the double payment of 
the war-cost under a credit policy, the 
problem to be faced is whether or not 
the people of one generation have the power 
and inclination of exercising foresight 
and self-restraint to submit to direct 
present burdens for the sake of avoiding 
later more extensive burdens; 
-that in the critical industrial and com-
mcrcial disorgani'sation incident to a 
state of war, whatever financial policy 
w~y be deemed less likely to exaggerate 
the economi.c stress, should be the method 
adopted, which of coui•se must be the · 
policy that attracts, rather than appro-
priates, capital. 
(4) Conclusions regarding the use of emergency revenue instrun1ents: 
(a) to meet early expenses of war: 
-surplus funds in the federal treasury; 
-treasury notes issued immediately on short terms·; 
-increased rates on present tax schedules; 
(b) to meet generoal expenses of war: 
-increased and additional taxation to the 
limits of acceptability; 
________________________________________ j 
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-long-term loans, pl"eferably with definite 
provisions fo~ installment cancellations, 
to meet the balance of expenditure tm-
provided for by taxation; 
(c) to meet permanent expenses of war: 
-retention of increases or additions to 
antibellum tax ~schedules, sufficient to 
meet the current expenses of government 
on a peace establishment, the interest 
charges on the public debt, and the pro-
visions for the discharge of obligations 
assumed during the period of extra.ol"'dinary 
expenditure. 
(5) Discussion of other influences on emergency policy formation: 
(a) the financial policies of the Crimean War, 
II. History: 
the South African Tlar, and the present European 
'War; 
(b) the conditions of federal finance in England 
during the periods involved in these wars; 
(c) general conclusions on the influence exerted 
by current conditions on the formation of 
the emergency policies. 
!Zegat,ding emel''gency taxation in the financial history of 
the United States: 
(x) A statement of the point of view assumed. 
--- --~ 
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:e (1) The emergency legislation of the War of 1812: 
• 
(a)_ the state of the finances previous to the war; 
(b) adoption and failure of the credit policy of 
financiering; 
(c) taxation proposals to meet the emergenqy situation; 
(d) the tax legislation of the war period; 
(e) the repeal of the emergency measures after the war; 
(f) criticism of the emergency scheme; 
(2) The emergency legislation of the Civil War: 
(a) the financial situation at the outset of hostilities; 
(o) early mismanagement of public credit; 
(c) proposals for emer~ency. taxation to meet the crisis; 
(d) the Internal Revenue Laws of the war period; 
(e) the repeal of the emergency measures after the war; 
(f) receipts from the extra taxes. 
(3) The emergency legislation of the Spanish War: 
(a) conditions of the federal finances at the start; 
(b) budget proposals for financing the war; 
(c) the enactment of the Uar Revenue Law of 1898; 
(d) the War Revenue Law of 1898: 
-increases in excise rates on commodities 
already taxed; 
-specific taxes on individuals and corpo-
rations eneaged in certain businesses; 
-stamp taxes on documents of legal and busi-
ness transactions; 
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-new excise taxes on specified conunod-
ities and on gross receipts of certain 
industries; 
-tax on legacies and distributive shares 
of personal property; 
-other provisions of the Law; 
( e·) effect of extra taxes on the federal revenues; 
(f) criticism of the emergency scheme; 
(4) The emergency legislation of the European War: 
(a) the need for additional revenue; 
III. Criticism: 
(b) transitional stage in federal finance; 
(c) _the enactment of the. War Revenue Law of 1914; 
(d) the War Revenue Law of 1914: 
-excise ta::<~es on distilled and fermented 
liquors; 
-special taxes on individuals and corpo-
rations engaged in certain businesses; 
~excise taxes: on doctunents of legal 
and business transactions; on certain 
specified commodities in Schedule B; 
(e) continuation of the Law. 
Regarding particular taxes in the scheme of emergency 
taxation: 
(1) Taxes on spirituous and fermented liquors: 
- .. 
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(a) the previous history of such taxation; 
(b) the enactment of -the current legislation; 
(c) the repeal.~of these laws; 
(d) the productiveness of the ta)q 
(e) the effect of the extra taxation on the industry; 
(f) criticism of this form of taxation. 
(2) Taxes on manufactured goods and products: Ibid. 
(3) Taxes on gross receipts of certain corporations: Ibid. 
(4) Stamp taxes on documents of business and legal transactions, 
on proprietary articles and patent medicines: Ibid. 
(5) Special taxes on individuals and corporations engaged 
in certain businesses: Ibid. 
(6) Taxes on legacies and distributive shares of property: Ibid. 
(7) Taxes on income: Ibid. 
IV. Conclusion: 
Regarding federal taxation in times of emergency: 
(1) 
9/ 
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I. 
INTRODUCTION 
Regarding taxation as an integral part of the emergency 
financial system: 
Before entering upon a study of 
federal emergency taxation, it might be well, first, to bring 
,e clearly to view one or two questions of an ethical aspect, 
which appear with unusual significance when this subject is 
opened for discussion. These questions may be stated at once, 
as follows: 
I. To what extent does the present generation possess the 
right of incurring economic liabilities against posterity 
beyond necessity; and 
II. To what measure is the application of ordinary economic 
motives appropriate to the determination of an emergency 
financial policy? 
I shall not presume to answer either of these disputed quest-
ions by declaring fixed rules or limitations, but shall, un-
doubtedly, display by inferences here and there the conclu-
sions I hold in these matters. The justice of any particular 
12/ 
financial scheme is largely dependent upon a multitude of 
conditions in effect during the period of time involved, so 
that an ethical rule pertaining thereto, no matter what its 
nature, must be to a considerable degree an arbitrary pre-
cept. 
Emergency finance may, like every 
other restricted field of fiscal operations, be reduced to 
a formula of possibilities, on which all students may meet 
in absolute agreement. Such a formula might be expressed 
here in the following manner: 
1st~ the entire extraordinary expenditures should be met by 
the returns from newly-laid taxation., with no permanent 
increases to the public indebtedness; or 
2nd. the entire extraordinary expenditures should be met by 
the returns from loans, with no additional taxation beyond 
that necessary for the support of public credit; or 
3rd~ the entire extraordinary expenditures should be met by 
some combination of the two above-stated methods, involving 
the merits and avoiding the demerits of each. 
Forbearance on the part of taxation extremists to the extent 
of sanctioning temporary loans to meet immediate treasury 
needs, and admission by loan-policy extremists of the neces-
sity of levying new taxes adequate for the support of credit, 
are assumed, as conditions incident to ordinary financial 
• 
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intelligence. 
Another method of emergency fin-
anciering might be mentioned and dismissed at once: that of 
meeting the extraordinary expenses of a period of crisis from 
a surplus~~ collected in time of prosperity, against adversity. 
This was the method advocated by Albert Gallatin in his "war 
report" of 1807 ,~H~ for a policy to meet the demands of a seem-
ingly impending rupture with one of the European powers. In 
that report, after reviewing the treasury situation of the 
few preceding years, in which the characteristic operation 
had been the assignment of the relatively enormous sum of eight 
millions of dollars annually to the payment of the interest on~ 
and the reduction of the principal of, the public debt, and 
after reckoning estimates of the federal receipts and expendi-
tures for the following few years immediately succeeding, the 
Secretary ventured the assertion that "an annual unappropriated 
surplus of at least three millions of dollars may, henceforth, 
be relied upon with great confidence." Under such favorable cir-
c~tances, Gallatin argued that it might be deemed advisable 
to allow an accumulation on the government's account of this 
annual treasury balance into a federal fund, which, in case of 
war, might serve to defray the extraordinary expenses involved, 
~( H.C.Ad;.J.r:w: The Science of Fin::-.nco, Bk. III., Chap. 1, 
Soct. 79, hao n discuoGion of ~1is fin~ncial method. 
-:Hf Report on Sta t<1 of the Fiilcmce:::;, lrov. 7, 1807, Amer. 
St[:.te Papers, Finance, II., p. 248. 
• 
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diminishing the need for floating loans or for imposing 
additional taxes. By such actual provision in time of peace 
for preparedness against future financial exigency in time 
of war, Gallatin sought to avoid the otherwise necessary 
policy of laying burdens on the country when it was least 
able to bear them, or of impairing, by the contracting of in-
debtedness, the resources of future generations. The fact that 
the public moneys of the United States were deposited in banks 
throughout the country, and were not, by reason of their baing 
a federal fund, withdrawn from circulation, removed, he 
thought, the one objectionable feature assignable to former 
practises of this same method in oth~r countries. 
The manifest objections to this 
schema of emergency financiering appear at once~ In the first 
place, assuming the premise that such a fund should exist 
in an uninvested form, the method would be too costly a 
one for consideration. On the other hand, assuming that the 
proposed fund should be maintained in an invested form,· the 
difficulty of immediate transformation of such stocks into 
capital available for expenditure is equally obvious; while 
the financial loss entailed upon the federal treasury through 
depreciation in value, consequent on the precipitation of so 
much stock on the market at one time, would render the scheme 
again uneconomical. These ordinary rebuffs hurled at so simple 
and ideal a policy, when reinforced by a consideration of the 
-··- ~ 
~T -
• 
• 
15/ 
difficulties incident to the necessary shelving of the pork-
ba~rel in the modern political game, dismiss this policy of 
fore-arming financially for war as an antiquated method. We 
disregard it at this point as void of any qualities of en-
lightenment on future policies, . 
The most eminent public financier 
holding radically to the first view mentioned in the formula 
above-drawn, namely, that extraordinary expenses should be 
met chiefly by the returns from newly-laid taxes, not from 
loans, was William E. Gladstone, Chancellor of the English 
Exchequer in the Aberdeen Cabinet, 1852-55, and finance min-
ister for England at the beginning of the Crimean War. It was 
his expressed belief that the ."cost of war"· represented "the 
moral check placed by the Almighty on the lust of conquest."~~ 
This was nothing more than a personal declaration of an ethi-
cal precept; it was not a financial argument. Gladstone fur-
ther held the opinion that the system of meeting the expenses 
of war through the agency of the incurring of indebtedness 
against posterity represented nwholesale, systematic, and 
continual deception" on the people, who could not be expected 
to understand the economic bearings of such an indirect 
process, His argument of the illusion foisted upon the minds 
of men in the matter was based upon an economic relation 
common in theoretical discussion of the nature and objects 
and legitimacy of the use of public credit • 
. ,,. Dud.::.;ot spooch-P.::.::.~li::u:1-::mto.ry Dob~·.t.Gs, CXX.XII., 14:13-70. 
,. 
.. . . ' 
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In Mill: Principles of Political 
Econom;y: ,-::- as a part of his discussion on the question as to 
"whether the funds required by a government for extraordinary 
unproductive expenditure are best raised by loans", a some-
what clearer statement of this economic argument is to be 
found. In that chapter Mill takes into consideration the argu-
ment of a certain Dr, Chambers, an ardent advocate of taxation 
as a basis for emergency revenue. In contravention to the 
notion commonly held, that to take the whole amount ,.needed 
by the defending government for extraordinary military and 
naval expenditure from the people in one year by means of 
• taxation would be to require that which is either impossible, 
or at least very inconvenient; that people cannot, without 
great hardship, pay out of their yearly income the whole fund 
necessary, but can better pay a little every year in the form 
of interest than bear the whole sacrifice at once; -in contra• 
.vention to this notion, the true economic facts, if diligently 
reasoned out, reveal the astounding evidence that in e~ther 
case the sacrifice involved is equally burdensome. The basis 
for this assertion is found in the claim that whatever is spent 
cannot but be drawn from the yearly income. "The whole and every 
part of the wealth produced in the country forms, or helps to 
• form, the yearly income of somebody. The privation which it is 
.. l.lill: ::?rinciplcs of' Political Econony, Dk. I., Chap. 5, Pal~. l. 
- .. 
~· 
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supposed must re~ult from taking the amount in the form of 
taxes is not avoided by taking it in a loan. The suffering 
is not averted, but only thrown upon the laboring-classes, the 
least able, and who least ought, to bear it; while all the in-
conveniences, physical, moral, and political, produced by 
maintaining taxes for the perpetual payment of the interest, 
are incurred in pure loss." By this he means that the privation 
attendant upon the raising of extraordinary revenue is the same, 
no matter in what form the latter comes into the public treas-
ury. Why? Because such revenues come from the same source, 
and leave a deficit in the same place, -the yearly income 
of the people. Were this revenue, , .. gather.ed in the form- of 
loans, drawn from capital previously expended in industrial 
enterprise, then such withdrawal would represent pure economic 
loss to the country; besides, it would occasion a shifting 
of the great burden onto the shoulders of the laboring-men, 
for the diminishing of capital first falls on the wage-fund 
paid to labor. When the crisis is ended, moreover, having paid, 
even under the loan-policy, the whole penalty of privation, 
there remains the necessity of facing on the return of peace, 
not a book of closed accounts, but the prospect of carrying 
the whole charge of t!te debt and the payment of interest in 
perpetuity. The deception noted by Gladstone was none other than 
the claimed fallacy in public understanding set forth by 
' 
Chambers. 
This same proposition is stated 
~---~-=---
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clearly in Adams: Public Debts,~:in the following way: "if the 
war entail a debt upon the following generation its burden is 
borne twice -once by the fathers who furnished the capital 
that was destroyed, and once by the sons who furnished the 
money to expunge the debt." Assuming that no such statement 
of mere truism in economic theory is a final argument in 
favor of the taxing policy and against the credit policy, the 
above-quoted writer suggests that there is a difference be-
tween capital expended in a war and the actual financial bur-
den imposed on a people under a state of war, and he declares 
the first princip;te.~of a good war policy to be: that the source 
of government revenue be not pressed .so hard but that the flow 
may be maintained at its height throughout the crisis. Considera-
tion may be given, also, of the possibilities of negotiating 
loans from foreign countries, and of engaging such domestic free 
capital as might be expected to exist throughout the country 
' 
in the presence of the commercial depression usually accompany-
ing the continuance of a state of war.~H: Adams's practical 
answer to the proposition that, under the procedure of a loan-
policy, the expenses of war are twice borne, is as follows: 
"It is altogether by the mark to say that loans must in the end 
be paid from the proceeds of taxes, and that,· in c~msequence 1 
~t- Ac~_arls: Publi'c Debts, Pt., II., P• 108 of Ch. 1. 
-:H:· Practical rofe:conce to such available funds in Galla tin's 
Report on St~te of the Fin:.nceo, before referred-to. 
···- ... 
,. 
19/ 
the advantage of an appeal to credit is apparent rather than 
·• real. The question is whether the desire to avoid taxes in the 
future will induce men to suffer the burden of present payments. 
If they truthfully declare such willingness, there can be no 
necessity of resorting to credit. But if, as an analysis of 
character declares, the potency of motives is inversely as the 
remoteness of interests concerned, this abstract truth, that 
taxes must finally equal the sum borrowed, can not be relied 
upon to induce men to practise self-restraint in consumption, 
or to undergo severe toil in production. 11~r 
For an example of advocacy of the 
• second view in the formula presented at the beginning of this 
introduction, namely, that the entire extraordinary expendi-
tures should be met by the returms from loans, with no addi-
tional taxation beyond that necessary for the support of the 
public credit, we may turn to the history of emergency fin-
-ance in this country. In his plan submitted for the Support 
of Public Credit, January 14, 1790, Alexander Hamilton. 
stated these maxims regarding the legitimacy and the necessity 
of the use of public credit~ He said: 
"That exigencies are to be expected to occur, in the affairs 
of nations, in which there will be a necessity for borrow-
• ing;" and 
"That loans in times of public danger, especially from for-
eign war, are found an indispensable resource, even to the 
~:- II.C.Adru::n: l)t1.blic Debts, Pt, II., Ch. 1, P• 109-10. 
• 
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wealthiest of them".~~ 
This assertion of the legitimacy of engaging in debt in time · 
of public danger was clearly followed by Albert .. Gallatin in 
the formation of a fiscal policy when the·clouds of war were 
gathering during the years.l807-12. Gallatin's loan-policy ·· 
may best be comprehended through a study of its:development 
in his successive reports during these years.· . . , I ~ '· .. ' .. 
The foundation of the Gallatin ·r 
policy may be seen in a quotation from the report of 1807,~~~ 
in which he states that, as a basis for credit;financiering, 
"it appears necessary to provide a revenue at·least equal to 
the annual ~xpenses on a peace establishment, the interest on 
the existing debt, and the interest on the .loans.which may-be 
raised"." Only by the inclusion of such provision for the sup-
port of credit may a loan-policy scheme be entertained w-\_th : 
favor"• Gallatin's. deduction that loans rather than taxes should 
be relied upon 'most extensively was based on the theoryi.fexpress-
ed as follows: "Taxes are paid by the great mass of· the 'citizens, 
and immediately affect almost every individual-of the· commun-
ity. Loans are supplied by capitals previously accumulated by 
a few individuals." Should the country involved· in war be one. 
in which, in consequence of the nature of. its industrial and 
commercial relati'ons, the resources of the great masses·of in-
* Abet•icah State Papers, Fin:=.mce, I., p. 15. 
.;H~ Ibid. -II., 246-9. 
' ; •" '"! . 
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dividuals we:re.not generally nor materially affected by the 
conditions under a state of·war, then it might be practicable 
and wise to meet the greater part of the emergency demands · · 
by the increasing of taxation schedules. Then, too, the ceca-
cion might exist where, the credit of the nation: under any of 
various circumstances<being impaired, no other resource but h. 
that of taxation would be available. But in the United States, 
Gallatin asserted, neither of these conditions unfavorable to 
the loan-policy held; and that the country's industr~al and 
commercial relations and established credit pointed to the 
loan method as the proper policy to be adopted. to meet the 
needs of the impending war. "A marit~~e war will, in the United 
States, generally and deeply affect, whilst it continues, the 
resources of individuals; as not only commercial profits will 
be curtailed, but, principally, because a great portionof the 
surplus of agricultural produce necessarily requires a foreign 
I 
market. The reduced price of the principal articles exported 
from the United States will operate more heavily than any con-
templated tax. And, without inquiring whether a similar cause 
may not still more deeply and permanently affect a nation at 
war with the United States, it seems to follow that, so far as 
relates to America, the losses and privations caused by the war 
should not be aggravated by taxes beyond what· is strictly·nec-
eceary'. An addition to the debt is doubtless an evil; but ex-
·perience having now shown with what rapid progress the revenue 
l ,, 
I 
'' 
• 
•• 
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of the Union increases in time of peace; with what facility 
the debt formerly contracted h~s, in a few years, been re-
duced; a hope may confidently be entertained that all the evils 
of war will be temporary, and easily repaired; and that the 
return of peace will, without any effort, afford ample resources 
for reimbursing whatever may have been borrowed during -the war."* 
In 1808~H( Gallatin still held to 
the same opinions. Declaring that the only sources of legiti-
mate revenue were those of loans and taxes, he maintained 
that loans should be principally relied upon in case of war. 
I 
The events of the intervening year had, Gallatin asserted, 
corroborated his former stand, and nq reason for a change of 
opinion had as yet developed. Under the influence of the 
embargo, almost the entire "floating property of the nation" 
had been brought into the United States and kept there. In 
the domestic market the cramped conditions and relations had 
brought about the inevitable depreciation in val~es of home 
products, therby rendering improbable the possibility of 
the raising of considerable revenue from increased rates of 
taxation. While on the other hand, according to Gallatin's 
statement, which may be taken as authoritative, "at no former 
time (had) there been so much specie, so much redundant unem-
ployed capital, in the country.n Basing his judgment upon the 
facts.of the prevailing high prices of public stocks and of 
~~ American State Papers, Finance, II., 248. 
~H~ Ibid. -Finance, II., 307, Report on State of the Fin-
unces, December 16, 1808. 
e:.. 
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stocks generally, of the cOntinued reduction of the public 
debt, of "the unimpaired credit of the General Go,vernment", and 
of the large amount of bank stock existing in the country, the 
. 
Secretary felt no lack of confidence over the possibility of 
incurring additional indebtedness, and entertained no b~~ief but 
that such a policy would be the most legitimate, logical, 
' . ', ' 
and advantageous one for the country to follow in the crisis. 
In the face of these considerations, Gallatin, perhaps unwisely, 
declared that "No internal taxes, either direct or indirect, 
are --- contemplated, even in the case of hostilities carried 
against the two great belligerent powers." Facing a deficit 
_. in 1809, the Secretary had to admit again the possibility 
• 
·"!· 
that "a resort to internal taxes, either direc.t or indirect, 
may become necessary."~~ The object of these taxes, however, 
would be to meet the current expenses of the government on 
a peace establishment, so the loan-policy previously held 
still stood:. A:n elaboration of the Gallatin policy, and in-
formation regarding his actual proposals of sources from 
which loans might be advantageously derived, may be found in 
a report sent by him to the Ways and Means Committee on 
February 26, 1810, in response to a request for such data 
by that body .~H:· 
It must be noted that most all of 
Gallatin's proposals for supplying the federal treasury in 
~~ Report o·n State of the Finances, December• 8, 1809; American 
StatG Papers, Finance, II., 374. 
~H: Ibid. II.,ttloz.·'1· 
,24/ 
• time of war by means of increased national indebtedness, were 
backed by demands for increased taxation supposedly suffi-
cient to support the credit thus extended. In January, 1812, 
Gallatin, in a communication to the Ways and Means Committee 
in reply to a request for further, information explanatory 
• 
• 
; . 
to his late annual report on the State of the Finances,;~clearly 
demanded internal taxation as a basis for the floatation of 
loans 1 but no measure granting such support was passed~~ • The 
war began June 12 1 1812. Financial measures providing for 
extraordinary expenses were a six percent loan for eleven 
',' ~ I 
millions enacted March 14th preceding,*~~ and an authorization 
,,I·', 
of the issue of five millions in Treasury notes on June' 30th.~HHc 
The doubtful support of a doubled customs schedule was soon 
added.~:- ;~ A continuation of the policy of unsupported credit , 
went on until the summer of 1813, when it broke down miserably 
and measures were passed authorizing internal revenue duties 
I 
and direct taxes.;:- ~:--::- Further study of the developments of 
this period will be made later in this paper. Let it suf-
fice here to say that the failure of the financial opera-
tions of the War if 1812 does not stand as an argument 
against the efficacy of the loan-policy supported by adequate 
taxation, but stands only as an instance of an attempt to 
Finance, 
Statutes 
Ibid •. 
..Ibid~; 
Ibid., 
II·., PP• 523-27. 
at Lar3e, II., 694-G. 
-II.~ 766-8 • 
-II., 'l'b~- Cf .. 
-III., 22-34, 35-0, 40-7, 53•73, 77-81, 82-4. 
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finance a war on .a policy of unsupported credit, a method 
.. disastrous on its face. Regarding Gallatin's part in the opera-
tions, Dewey,. in his financial history, says: !',The responsibi-
lity (for the smashup of the summer of 1813) lies only in 
part with Gallatin; he had wavered in his advocacy of inter-
nal duties, and yet in a final judgment of his abilities at 
this crisis due weight should be given to the cli~ues within 
·,:,' 
the party which worked for his downfall and undoubtedly led 
him to rely too much upon hope and credit, instead of vigor-
ously and continually insnsting upon the needs of the present."{~ 
The third view set down in the 
e formula of possibilities for providing for the expenses of 
war before-mentioned, namely, that extFaordinary expenditures 
should be met by some combination of the tax policy and the 1. 
loan-policy calculated to include the merits and to exclude 
. , . 
the demerits of each, is in a way illustrated by the finan-
cial management of the present war by England. The very great 
divergence between the amount of revenue pouring into tne 
English treasury today from loans and that coming from taxa-
tion may serve to belittle an argument that the present 
British system makes much of the latter alternative; still, 
that the ethical principle· of the injustice of shifting the 
~ direct payment of treasury needs onto the future is regarded 
in th~ present system'iS indicated by the words.addressed 
by Lloyd-George to Parliament on the occasion of the intro-
~~ Dewey: Financial History of the Uni tecl Sta tos, (4th Ed.), 
p. 130. 
.- ~ 
• 
• 
26/ 
duction of the first war budget in 1914. ~~ Regarding taxa- . 
tiori he .said: 0 lf we 'do not tax and tax heavily,. it will be a 
serious departure, for the first time, from :the honored 
·tradition set and hitherto maintained by this country in. 
every war in which it has ever been· engagedl~n The influence 
exerted by the tremendous financial demands of modern· warfare 
. have rendered comparatively unimposing the part played'by 
taxation in war finance, despite the ethical standards--thus 
·still maintained. An idea of the changes which have ac.tually 
.taken place· in the tax revenue of England since the present war 
·began may be gained from a glance at ·the following figures, 
taken from the Bankers' Magazine(London) .of January, 1916: 
Year ending March 3;st . · Tax Revenue 
1914----~---------------198,243,000 l. 
1915--------------------226,694,000 1. 
1916------------~-------305,014,000·1·** 
1917--------------------387,000,000 
. ' 
·• ,, .I 
In spirit rather than decisively in effect it may be stated, 
. . 
therefore, that the English policy has been one recogni.zing 
' I; 
'. : . .' 
the ethical responsibility of the present generation toward 
the future. 
A review of the arguments in favor 
of an assertion that emergency revenues should be derived prin~ 
. ' 
e . cipally from taxation might be as follows: the tax-policy 
shoul.d be adopted, because of the reasons - (l)that upon the 
:.:· Report in London Times, November' 18, 1914. 
-:c-:~ Estimo.tes of Chancellor of the Exchequel:" in Budget Speech 
of Septombel:" 21, 1915. 
''"'I 
• 
• 
• 
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generation engaging in war is imposed, by· the ethical precept 
involved, the responsibility of assuming the whole economic 
burden entailed upon the country through their desire or ac-
quiescence to participate in the destructive.practise of war-
fare; (2)that economy and regardfulness in time .. of crisis are 
dependent upon the extent to which the people directly feel 
the burden of the structure of expenditure which they, by their 
decision, are piling up; (3)that the advocacy and extension of 
the. fallacy that the economic burden.imposed upon a people in 
time of emergency is lightened by the substitution of. a loan-
policy for a tax-policy in the meeting of current ·extraordina:by 
expenses, is an imposition, not only .on the parties: ·.to the sit-
uation, but on the science of public financef ::(:~:):that. war tax-
es may be considered to be instruments applicable to the 
measuring and intensifying of patriotism,' ·and. should be levied 
to that end, since it is hardly to be conceived that a self-
governing people would undertake a war they did not .favor, or 
which they would not suppo:bti. ----On the other hand; a review 
of the arguments in favor of an assertion that emergency rev-
enues should be derived principally from loans might be as 
follows: the credit-policy should be adopted,.because of the 
reasons ... (l)that the assumption of liabilities against poster-
ity is not to be set dovm as an unrecompensed and unauthorized 
imposition of economic burden offensive to ethical principles, 
• 
• 
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since modern wars are engaged in;- not for the advancement:·:'Of 
the material interests of the present generation; but for the 
defense of national principles and :rights' .'and yield. benefits 
which are not .temporary but permanent; (2)that economy and re-
gardfulness to a point of-restraint against free aggressiveness 
in military and naval programs under a state of war are not the 
qualifications of.good financial management that they are un-
der conditions of peace;·that·it must be conceded that-in 
time of emergency economy ranks secondary to adequacy; :(;3:):that 
whatever truth may be attributed to the-argument of the double 
·payment of the.war-cost under a credit-policy, ~he problem to 
be faced is whether or not the people of one generation have 
the power of exercising the foresight and-.self-restraint to 
submit to direct present burdens for the ·sake of·avoiding 
later more extensive indirect burdens; (4)that in .the critical 
industrial and commercial disorganisation incident to a state 
of war, whatever financial policy may be deemed less likely 
to exaggerate the economic stress, should be the·method adopt-
ed; which of course must be-the policy that attracts, rat!her 
than appropriates, capital. 
General principles regarding 
the use of the several avenues of resources at hand -in time 
of public danger might be somewhat arbitrarily laid down as 
follows: 
.... 
• 
• 
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·(l) To meet early expenses of war: 
(a) surplus funds in the federal treasury; 
(b) treasury notes issued immediately on short terms; 
(c) increased rates on present tax schedules. 
(2). ~o meet general expenses of war: 
(a) increased an additional taxation to the limit or 
acceptability; 
~:b) long-term loans, preferably with definite provisions 
·, · for installment cancellations, to meet the balance 
of expenditure unprovided· for by taxation •. · .. · · ·. 
(3) To meet .permanent expenses of war: ' · 
(a) retention of increases or. additions to antibellum 
·.tax schedules, sufficient to meet the current ex-
penses of government on a peace establishment,- the 
interest charges on the public debt, and the pro-
visions for the discharge of obligations assumed 
'' 
during' the period of extraor~inary. expenditure~· 
Having considered briefly the sev-
eral parts of the formula of possibilities as presented,\and 
having outlined certain conclusions drawn therefrom,· it· may 
be in order to discuss the matter of the effect exerted by in-
fluences, other. than those of theoretical or ethical argument,: . 
upon policy formation·• The extent to which the nature of fis-
cal programs is control1Led by the economic and financial con-
--
-..-~---··->-~--~----- - ____ ..,. ···- -- ·--
• 
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ditions of the periods of time dnvolv:ed, is very simply and 
clearly displayed in the different methods of finance adopted 
by England in her wars of the last century. The mention of 
..... ·, 
British war finance, of course, brings to mind a remembrance 
of Pitt, England's financier of the Napoleonic period. A-
study of the work of·Pitt and his followers bares some 
amazing facts in regard to the fiscal operations of that time. 
The cost of the Napoleonic Wars to England has_ been approxi-
mated at some 831,000,000 1., of which about 440,~00,00Q 1. 
r. . • ·: ~ . 
were raised by loans, and 391,000,000 1. by taxation over a 
period of twenty years.~} The estimated national income during 
. . . 
the Napoleonic period was about 250,000,000 1. IDhe revenue from 
taxation ranged from 50,000,000 1. to 70,000,000 per annum. 
. . . 
Therefore, as may be easily deduced, at different stages of the 
conflict, taxation took into the public treasury one-fifth, 
one-fourth, and almost one-third of the whole national income. 
'·, 
Lloyd-George, referring to this tremendous burden of taxation 
'-'·· 
of the Napoleonic period, stated to Parliament, "at that rate 
we would now be raising between 450,000,000 and 700,000,000 
pounds in taxation,n - a remark which was greeted with laughter 
throughout the House .:.B:· 
Indeed, little guidance may actually 
be taken from these early efforts of Pitt and h~s followers 
to tide England over fiscal crisis. The Crimean War was the 
~:- Fisrt1res based on review in London Times, Hovenber 17, '14. 
~(·::- }{irst Tie.r Budget speech, Nbvetber· 17, 1914. 
--- .... 
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first after the beginning of the ~rae-Trade e~a, and anything 
,, ', •:'' '• •, 
• further back is irrelevant to modern application or comparison. 
. •. 
In accordance .with his views that war expenses should be paid 
out by taxing the generation_ engaging in conflict, Gladstone, 
in his budget¥ demanded a radical increase of direct ;~xa-
.,.. ·_,·, 
tion, rather than any additions to the public indebtedness or 
-:. ), 
to indirect taxation. He wanted the people actually to feel the 
!'' "'t 
burdens occasioned by the war .-it- His first measure was to double 
'(• 
the income-tax:. The expenses of the invasion of the Crimea could 
not be met, however, by a mere increasing of the direct taxes, 
.. ' ·,, 
and Gladstone was forced to levy additional imposts on spirits 
t in Scotland and Ireland, rearrange the sugar duties so as to 
bring in more revenue, raise the malt tax, and later make 
' ~ .. 
further increases in indirect and direct taxation to meet 
the growing demands. In the winter of 1855, while the Crimean 
. . 
campaign was still in progress, it will be remembered that the 
Aberdeen ministry was overthrown because of alleged misman-
. . 
':' 
agement of the war, and in the newly-formed cabinet Gladstone 
.. ' 
., ..... , 
was succeeded by Sir George Lewis as Chancellor of the Ex-
chequer. The latter gentleman threw asid~ the prudent measures 
of his predecessor, and began to contracn loans to meet the 
extra demands on the treasury. Out of an estimated cost of 
• 67,500,000 1., loans to the amount of 32,000,000 1. were 
contra,cted, and taxation to the amount of 36,500,000 1. was 
collected .·:H~-
~~ Bright: 1Iistol"Y of England, p. 240. 
~Hl- Figures from London Tir:1es, Nov. 17, 1914. 
., 
• 
• 
32/ 
When the South African War broke out 
the Gladstonian arguments were renewed by the moralists in 
favor of greatly increased direct taxation. In effect, how-
ever, a change in actual policy took place. Out of the total 
cost of 2~7,166,000 1. for the Boer War, only 58,456,000 1. 
was raised bytaxation, while 9,228,000 l.·was ·secured by a 
suspension of the sinking-fund, and about 150,000,000 1. came 
in through the incurrence of new indebtedness'• ~r In the present 
war it will be seen that the balance sheet has swung the 
pendulum still further in the direction of financing a war 
chiefly through the agency of loans, though a certain degree 
of taxation is still maintained'. 
The variance in these three emer-
gency schemes, of the Crimean Invasion, the Boer Uprising, 
and the present European War, is largely explained by the 
financial conditions existing during the periods of time in-
, .. ,. 
valved in each case. The influence exerted by the latter con-
ditions may be discerned from a study of the following 
graphic chart, on which are represented .the curves or de-
creasing per capita interest charges on the public debt, 
and or increasing per capita returns from taxation, during 
the periods covering the Crimean, South African, and European 
Wars. 
(over) 
~~ !{'igures from London Titteo, Nov. 17, 1914. 
33/ 
I t . 
• 70"7o 
I 9 ...>o. '3d, 
'' .'! 
.. 
., .. 
' ·~ '. .; I \ ,y 
capita interest charge on public debt 
'' 
" 
direct and indirect tax revenue 
.·/ . 1.' ' 
During the period when Gladstone advocated payment of war 
cl expenses from taxation, the per capita charges on the public 
debt were high and the per capita taxation was low; of course 
the finance minister could preach ethical principles about 
• 
• ··l.\ \ ' 
,. a fighting generation's paying for its own wars. At the time 
. -
of the South African War, the per capita charges on the public 
'' I' 
debt had decreased and the per capita tax burden increased; 
naturally the tendency to shift more of the war burden onto 
;' 
loans found favor. At the present time, the per capita charges 
. •! . • • ·. ' .. ;. 
on the public debt have still further decreased and per capita 
taxation increased tremendously; under these circumstances the 
., 
'--
logical financial policy of the present ~ar must be one which 
emphasizes the use of credit to meet the unusual demands • 
This cold evidence, presented to 
the disparagement of Gladstone's ethical preachments, very 
- - ... 
• 
• 
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plainly shows that the theories generally advanced tend to 
conform to the financial phenomena of the periods involved, 
and that policies are shaped in harmony with, and as a 
direct result of, no ethical nor theoretical propaganda, 
but by the current conditions in. the financial position of the 
country. The old book-shelf maxims of Adam Smith, laid down 
on the characteristics of good taxation;:namely, those of 
equality, convenience, certainty, and economy, are found to 
fall short of some of the standards to be met in practical 
taxation, among the latter being those of acceptability and 
adequacy. If the total amount of funds necessary to finance a 
nation thrOugh a critical crisis is so great as to exceed 
what is peacefully acceptable to the tax-paying members of the 
community, it is evident that other economic means and motives 
must be resorted and appealed to. More vitally in harmony 
with the practical institution of tax-levying are the rules pro-
vided by Bastable, asserting the characteristics of exemplary 
taxes to be productiveness, economy, justice in distribution, 
and elasticity, the last-named, in particular, providing the 
possibility of adjustment in critical times to the bounds of 
acceptability. In this matter, especially in this country, too 
much attention cannot be given to the controlling factors, such 
as, the economic instincts in human nature, the limitations of 
~• Adam Smith: Uealth of Nations, Bk. II., Ch. 2, Pt. 2. 
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a popular grasp.of taxation principles, and the power swayed 
• by public opinion even in the molding of financial policies. 
One of the payments we make for the freedom and rights of 
democracy is the sacrifice and disorder entailed in the subor-
dination of theoretical and ideal formulae of administration 
to the limited vision, varied judgment, and unstandardized 
ethical conceptions of the heterogeneous mass of sovereign 
citizens. A common-sense view of the whole matter of emergency 
finance, as supported by historical evidence and practical 
reasoning, displays the process of policy formation as follows: 
pure theory and ethics, sparkling clear and correct as they may 
!J be, are thrown into the crucible of resources, past practises, 
and sectional influences, and from the compound is drawn a 
variously proportioned policy, whose chief characteristic is 
supposed sufficiency to meet the demands of the hour. The 
plain stand taken is: that war is a necessary evil; that in 
• 
a state of war the successful prosecution of military and nav-
al operations is of prime importance; that the foremost and 
pressing requisite of the financial scheme must be adequacy 
to meet the federal needs; and the method that will supply 
this demand, with little comparative regard to its other 
characteristics, is the method to be employed • 
• 
• 
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II. 
HISTORY 
Regarding emergency taxation in the financial history 
of the United States: 
A fiscal emergency, in the sense 
as used in this study, may be said to occur when Congress, 
by reason of some extraordinary diminution of the federal 
income or addition to the federal expenses or both, is 
compelled to enact laws providing for additional revenue to 
enable the administration to carry on the work of government, 
including the national defense. Such emergency periods, it 
is assumed, have occurred four times in the history of our 
country since the adoption of the Constitution in 1789, name-
ly, (l)during the period of the War of 1812; (2)during the per-
iod of the Civil War; (3)during the period of the Spanish War; 
(4)during the period of the present European War. With refer-
ence to the fiscal operations of the first two decades of the 
country's history, almost all of which was temporary, experi-
• 
• 
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mental, and, in a sense, emergency legislation, no comment is 
made, since the emergency situations involved were emergencies 
of development, not resultant from the precipitation of any 
extraordinary conditions of affairs. Then, too, the war policy 
of the period of the Mexican hostilities is passed by, since 
that policy was one based exclusively on public credit, while 
the present study is one emphasizing the part played by taxa-
tion in government fiscal crises. 
In dealing wi~h the experience 
of the United States in the four critical periods above-mention-
ed, I have thought it proper to examine each one separately 
and independently, confining myself. to a review of the actual 
legislation enacted in each crisis to meet the emergency 
needs, reserving criticism and comparison to the next section 
on the development and effectiveness of particular taxes in 
the emergency scheme. The remainder of this part, therefore, 
includes: a brief resume of (l)the emergency legislation of 
the VTar of 1812;c {2)the emergency legislation of the Civil 
War; (3)the emergency legislation of the Spanish War; and 
(4)the emergency legislation of the European War. ---------
- .. 
• 
• 
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A. The emergency legislation of the War of 1812: 
Remembering the specifications ad-
vanced by Gallatin in his annual pre-war reports and communi-
cations, regarding the advisabi.lity of engaging in a loan-
policy supported by adequate taxation increases to cover the 
current expenses on a peace establishment, the interest on the 
public debt, and the interest on the new debt, we may now attend 
to a review of the financial legislation enacted during and after 
the period of hostilities, to see if the above-named injunctions 
were carried out in actual practiseo Under the cloud of approach-
ing war, Congress authorized, in March, 1812, a loan of 
$11,000,000.~~ The declaration of war came on June 18th, and 
on June 28th, Gallatin submitted a set of revised estimates 
to Congress , as follows: 
Expenditures: 
Civil and miscellaneous---------------------$ 
Hilitary establishment, Indian service------
Naval establishment-------------------------
Public debt---------------------------------
$ 
Funds provided: 
Balance in the treasury, Jan~ 1st.----------$ 
Estimated receipts from customs-------------
Loan authorized-----------------------------
Treaaury notes------------------------------
$ 
1,560,000 
12,800,000 
3,940,000 
a,ooo,ooo 
26,300,000 
2,000,000 
8,200,000 
11,000,000 
5,000,000 
26 1 200 1 000-:H:· 
To supply the immediate needs of the treasury this last-
named item of $5,000,000 in treasury notes was authorized 
~' l~ct of ~.In.rch 1~-t, 1812, Stn.t1~tos, II., G\J4-5. 
;~-:i- Ec coil)·t,n 'l.11Cl E::1)011cli t11rco E0 ti:::::t ted fo1., 1812, ~ina11ee, 
II., !JGO. 
... 
• 
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two days after the receipt of the revised budget.~:- Under the 
authorization to borrow conferred in March preceding, but 
$6,118,900 of the $11,000,000 had been subscribed, $4,190,000 
of that coming from banks; while Gallatints proposal that the 
balance desired within the limits of the loan be issued in treas-
1..1!" y notes, had been ignored. ·:H:- To support the extended credit 
obligations of the government, Congress passed an Act doubling 
the customs rates then in force 1 -lHH:· imposing an additional ten 
percent to this increase in the case of goods brought over in 
ships not wholly of the United States, and providing a tonnage 
fee of one and a half dollars per ton on all such ships. This 
measure was to be effective to the end of the war and for one 
year thereafter. The one hundred percent increase in customs 
rates remained in force throughout the war, and was continued, 
by a subsequent Act,-::- -::beyond its point of ordinary expira-
tion, till June 30, 1816, when the increase was to be reduced 
to forty-two percent. This latter provision was, however, 
nullified by the passage of the Tariff Acj; of April, 1816,-:r -::~:­
repealing all previous Acts and parts of Acts relating to that 
subject. This increasing of the customs rates did not bring about 
a corresponding increase in the revenue from customs. The 
foreign trade of the country practically ceased with the 
declaration of war, the accustomary channels of exchange being 
effectively blocked by the maritime character of the hostil-
1 ties.-:~-::- -::· The federal income fl"om the customs servj.ce fell 
P?otnotes continued. 
• 
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in 1814 and 1815 to figures on a par with the year 1808, 
when the full force of the government restrictions on commerce 
were being felt.~: Thus far Gallatin!s early recommendations 
were being carried out with some degree of exactness, and 
the fallacy of expecting to support credit:on such an unsta-
ble foundation as the increase of customs rates ·was quickly 
asserting itself. In February, 1813, another loan was author-
ized, in accordance with Gallatin's demand in his annual 
report, of December, 1812, for $21,000,000, of which~~-:: 
$16,000,000 was to be floated as a direct loan, $5,000,000 
to be issued in the form of treasury notes. ~H:·~~ The M:edi ter-
ranean Duties were continued by Act of February 27th.~~ ~:- but 
the revenue from this source, depending upon the volume of 
ad valorem imports, fell correspondingly as the amount of the 
latter was diminished. This method of procedure could not, of 
course, last very long, and in the summer of 1813 the policy 
of financiering the war by means of practically unsupponted 
credit broke down utterly. The necessity for a system of 
internal taxation was clearly apparent. 
In their report to the House of 
ComEmnic.:>. tion on Subscription of Loan, Fin:mce, II., SG4-8. 
Statutes, II.: 7G8-9. 
~ct of February 5, 181G, Statutes, III., 253. 
Statutes, III., 310-15. 
To.uosle;: r.rariff rLi.ntory, P• ) 
General Statistic~;, C:l1s.rt on Govel'nnent. Tleco:Lpts. 
Act of Feb. 8, 1813, Statutes, II., 798-0. 
" " " 25, " " " 801-2. 
Statrr~os, II., 809. 
• 
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Representatives on June 10, 1813, the Ways and Means Committee 
declared that "a provision for additional revenue (could) not 
longer be delayed without a violation of those principles held 
sacred in every country where the value and importance of nat-
ional credit have been justlynes.timated. "~~ Rehearsing the old 
maxims of Gallatin, that a tax-revenue should be provided 
capable of bearing the expenses of the peace establishment, the 
• 
charges on account of the public debt, and the interest on new 
loans, the Committee proceeded to estimate the sum thus to be 
met wholly by taxation, as follows: 
Expenses on a peace establishment for year, 1814---$ 7,000,000 
Interest on total public debt---------------------- 4,400,000 
. fll,400,000 
Estimated receipts from existing system------------~ 5,800,000 
Deficiency-----------------------------------------' 5,600,000 
To be met by-
A direct tax of------------------------...:-----------$ 3,000 1 000 
and Internal Revenue from-
Duties on stills--------------------------------
11 
11 refined suaars------------------------
11 
11 retailers 10licenses-------------------
" 
11 sales at auction----------------------
11 
11 carriages-----------------------------
11 " bank notes and negotiable paper-------
" 
11 salt at 20 cts.-----------------------
11 
11 additions to foreign tonnage----------
~~~~~:-~~:-~~==~~~~~~~:-~~:~~~~=~~~:-=~~~=~:-~~::::i 
765,000 
200,000 
500,000 
50,000 
150,000 
100,000 
400,000 
900,000 
750,000 
5,615,000 
The Committee accordingly recommended Bills for consideration, 
as follows: 
(1) A bill for the assessment and collection of direct taxes • 
(2) " 11 to lay and collect a direct tax in the United States. 
(3) " 11 laying a duty on imported salt. 
(4) " 11 establishing the office of Commissioner of Revenue. 
(5) " 11 laying duties on retailers' of wines, spirituous 
liquors, and foreign mer.chandise. 
-::- Ju::.criccm 8t.:>.t,o Paporc, Fin~u1cc, II., Pl). £. l.. r-7:. 
• 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) (10) 
(11) 
(12) 
A bill laying duties on carriages for the conveyance 
of parsons. 
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A bill laying duties on licenses to distillers of spirit-
uous liquors. 
A bill laying duties on sales at auction of foreign mer-
chandise, and of ships and vessels. 
A bill laying duties on sugars refined within the u.s. 
" " " " " bank notes and notes of hand, and 
on foeeign bills of exchange of certain descriptions. 
A bill providing further provision for the collection 
ofinternal duties. 
A bill laying an additional duty on foreign tonnage. 
On July 22nd, Congress faced the inevitable and, by a measure 
entitled "An Act for the assessment and collection of direct 
taxes and internal duties"~~ brought iLnto being the machinery 
for the administration of the subsequent internal revenue and 
direct tax laws soon to be passed. Collection districts were 
designated in all the states, comprising of counties, groups 
of cotmties, parishes, etc.; the offices of principal assessor 
and collector were created in each of these districts; and the 
minor and assessory details of administration were agreed upon. 
As a basis for the assessment of future direct taxes the 
restrictions were laid down to land, lots of land with the 
improvements thereon, dwelling-houses, and slaves, Two days 
later the first internal revenue duty was enacted in the 
form of a tax of 4 eta. per pound to be paid on all sugar 
refined Tii thin the United States .~H:· The office of Commissioner 
of the Revenue was established on July 24th, and his work was 
to be under the supervision of the Secretary of the Treasury.~H:·~=· 
~~ Sto.ttttos, III., 22-34:. 
~H~ Act of July 24, 1813, Statutes, III., 35. 
·:<·::--::· ~tatutos, III., 30. 
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Along with this action came an extension of the schedule 
~ to include: (1) a duty on carriages used for the convey-
ance of persons, providing specific rates varying with the 
description of the vehicle;~: {2) a system of licenses for 
distillers of spirituous liquors, based on the length of time 
in operation, the capacity of the. still, and the kinds of 
materials used, whether domestic of foreign;~:.::· ;(:3): a per-
centage duty on the purchase money of sales at auction of 
goods, wares, and merchandise, .and of ships and vessels;·::-~:-~:­
These internal revenue duties were to go into effect on Jan-
uary 1, 1814, and were to continue in force to the end of 
•; the year, and for one year thereafter~ On July 29, the tariff 
" 
~~ st~'<tutes, III. 1 40-1. The 1,atcs imposed by this Act wore 
n 1'} ,~ts 1 o ~--017S: 
Descl .. iption of the vehicle Annual tax 
CoRch-------~----------------------------$20,00 
Chariot, otc.---------------------------- 17.00 
Phaeton, ate.-----·---------------------- 10.00 
4 ~1eel carrince(stoo1 spr.)------------- 7.00 
11 
" 
11 (r;oodon s11r.)------------ 4.00 
All others---···-------------------------- 2.00 
-:He- Ibid. 42-4. The r~ tes imposed by this Act weru an 
lous: 
Dom. Hat. For. 
·.1lcs • per cal. 02.pacity 
fo1-
! I11 t • 
For tr.·o 
" one r;w • rr r7 " 
f1 
9 cts. 
18 " 25 cts. 
II 
II 
II 
II 
If 
2 
3 
4 
G 
12 
" II 
II 
" II 
II 
II 
II 
" If 
II 
II 
II 
fl 
II 
II 
II 
11 
II 
In case of distillinG by steac 
icr. 
32 11 
42 II GO " 
52 " 
70 tl 105 " 108 II 135 fl 
boilers tho I'D .. ten '.70l'e hoo.v-
~H:--::· Ibid. 14-7. The 11orcentage of pm'chuso mono~,r due nncJ.or this 
Act ~as as follows: 
0~1 s:~los at s.uction of goods, wares, and norclL'.ndi so: 01 per $100 of purch~se price. 
On ships aml. vossolo soJ.d at auction: 
(; .25 poP ~;100 of purchase price. 
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• duty on salt, long ago demanded by Gallatin,~:-was reimposed.·::-::· 
The next series of additions to the 
system of internal revenue taxes thus far established came on 
August 2nd, 1813. On that date (1) duties were laid on licenses 
to retailers of wines, of spirituous liquors, and of foreign 
merchandise ,~HH'> peculiar specific taxes depending in amount on 
the density of population and the character of the community 
in which the tax-payer operated; (2) stamp duties were laid on 
banks and bankers, and on certain companies, and on notes, 
bonds, discounts 1 and bills of exchange of certain descriptions.~: ~: 
., These dunies, also, were to go into effect on January lst, 1814 1 
'·· 
and were to continue to the end of the war and for one year 
thereafter. The revenue system thus established, and which formed 
~.. Galla tin, in his Report on the Sta to of the Finances, Hov. 
7, 180?, (Araer. State Papers, Finance, II., 24G), propoood 
Jc,he P011C'i7c..l of the very pr>oduc ti ve SD.l t tm=, dPoppcd tho 
ycc..r before. . , 
-:H:· Statutes, III., 49-50. The rate 1ras to be 20 cts. pGI' bu. 
~HH:· Rot,alle:t•s under• th1s Act wer·o defined as follo;'ls: 
In foreign norch::~ndiso: 
~8llin3 any goods, ~arcs, or norchandisc, not of SPO~th, 
produce, Ol ... i:;o.nufac ture uf tho united States, o::cept such 
u.s may be ::>old by im::_1orters in origin:?.l G.:J..Sl\: 1 co.so, bo::, 
or pacb.1.ce, rihol'O in imported. 
In ~·:ines: 
3ellin~ Tiinos in leG8 1unntitieS nt one time than 30 GUl-
lons, e~cept importer, etc,. 
In spirituous liquors: 
3olline spirituous liquors in less quantities than 20 ral-
1 L v OnG, 0 uC • 
Phy!:;ic:tans, f\.}1othecA.ries, chemists, etc., and direct dis-
tillery snlos of over 5 gallons, etc., wero excluded. 
T!1e 1..,a te s ~a oro: 
In cities, touns, and villacos, of 100 fanillcs per sq. mi. 
AJ 1 thre e---\7i ~1es- --S'J.0i , ... its---Dora. S·oir. ---•·1 ,..,,..,,.,'1.1~ •1rl 1.· ..... (' · .. , - * 4 ... vJ.v ~... .. ~\..0. u., 
.·\f) r: ,.,,.) ,,. 1 c:: ~!~~---------~~-------~J-------- v--------·--15 
In .. other cor:urtlmi t.if'ls of loco tJ.mn 100 :rr~;.dl:i.e:J por Gq. ;:li. 
:;_;15--- .... ·--- -1~1-- ......... ·~ --12-- ·"9- w .. ~----12---- ... ··- ... -.. --10 
-:;. ~:.. f:.ltc.ttltco, III., 77, 
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the general foundation of the emergency internal revenue scl1eme 
of which later Acts were amendatory or accessory, so far com-
prised of new duties on sales at auction of merchandise and ships 
and vessels; on sugar refined within the United States; on car-
riages for the conveyance of persons; on licenses to retail deal-
ers in wines, spirituous liquors and foreign-menchandise; on 
licenses to distillers of spiri~uous .liquors; on banks, bankers, 
and certain companies, on notes, bonds, and obligations discount-
ed by banks, bankers, and certain companies, and on bills of 
exchange of certain descriptions. 
A new loan of $7,500,000 was, also, 
authorized on August 2nd, 1813;": further provisions were made 
regarding the manner of collection of internal duties;-::-~: and 
a direct tax was enacted, to the amount of $3,000,000, to be 
divided among the states and apportioned to the districts des-
ignated by the Act of July 22nd, unless the states saw fit to 
vary the apportionments within their limits ·"HH:- The states 
were allowed to assume the whole quota allotted to them, and 
were to benefit by a reduced rate in case of prompt payment.~: -::-
The tax was to be levied in February, 1814~ There was little 
opposition to the new taxes,,,. -:H~ Gallatin's prediction that 
such duties would be "cheerfully borne as war taxes''-::--::- -:: 
being clearly fulfilled. In May, 1813, in the midst of the 
financial distress which marked the breaking-down of the cre-
dit policy, Gallatin, much maligned, had decided to absent 
himself from the scene of operations. 
Foot-notGs continned. 
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At his own request his actual connection with the treasury 
~ department had been severed, and he was soon on his way across 
the waters to St. Petersburg on a diplomatic mission to secure 
the proffered mediation of the Czar of Russia between the United 
States and Great Britain.~~-:~.;:--:~ The management of the treasury was 
left temporarily with William Jones, Secretary of the Navy. In 
February, 1814, Galla tin resigned'f was succeeded by Campbell; 
who, in turn, was succeeded by Dallas, in October, 1814. Under 
the administration of the latter the credit policy was con-
tinued, though the remaining loans were contracted under the 
most distressing conditions. On March 4th, 1814, a new issue 
~~ of treasury noyes for $10,000,000 w~s enacted;·:;. ~H~-:~ and on March 
24th, came the authorization of a loan to the amount of 
$25,000,000 .~H: ~:--:: No previous loan had been negotiated under 
such disadvantageous terms, as this turned out to be. In bor-
rowing the first insjallment, the government was forced into 
an agreement with the subscribers whereby the latter would 
benefit by any more advantageous terms which might be enter-
ed into with later contributors to the loan.;F.H:- .;~ Subscriptions 
were received at a 12% discount; later at a 20% discount; 
and still later were receivable in state bank-notes worth 
only 65 cts. on the dollar. In August, specie payments were 
(~:· Statuteo, III., 75-7. ~m Ibid. III.,82-4. 
~:~:· .. ~~ Ibid. III., 53-73. 
" ~: 15f; deduction if payed bofol"o February 10, 1814; 10;:; 
:coduction if paycd before I.Iay 1, 1814. 
·::· ~H:- Ho·.1o: Taxation and. Taxer., p."f3. 
·:H:· -::· St:ttc Papers, Finance, II., 246. ~HH:··::· Stevena:. Gallatin, 222. 
-::-- .. ::··::-~:- ~)to..ttlten, III., 100-8. ·:: .. :~ ~:·~} Ibld~, III., lll--2. 
*** * Donoy: Financial lli3tory, p. 134.(4t~ cd.) 
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suspended, a development laid by Gallatin to the dissolution 
of the Bank of the United States as an institution capable 
of relieving the tension of such a situation·.~~ The last 
loan during the period of hostilities was authorized under 
the Act of November 5, 1814, and was for the sum of three 
millions of dollars .{H!- On December 24th, the treaty of peace 
was signed. Additional treasury notes were authorized on 
December 26th, r'or $10,500,000, but $7,500,000 of those 
were to supersede amounts still unsubscribed under the au-
thorizations to borrow $25,000 1 000 and $3,000,000 previously 
given.-:HH~ The treasury-note issues were increased by another 
•~ addition under the law of February, 1815, for $25,000,000 .~;. .;" 
\.. 
•• 
The Internal Revenue System, too, 
was subjected to several changes during these months. The 
former carriage tax of varying rates according to the des-
cription of the vehicle, was superseded by a new tax assessed 
on the valuations; to be put in effect on January lst,l815 .~: ·l~~:· 
Duties on distilled spirits were imposed by the Act of December 
21,1814, in addition to the license dut~es already levied 
It is our deliberate opinion that the suspension uicht 
have been prevented at the time nhen it took place, 
had the former b~:nk of the United States boon still in 
existence. -Considerations on tho Currency and Bankinc 
System of the·unitec1 States. ;1ritingo, III., lGl-3. 
Statutes, III., 144-5. ~~-;~-:;.Ibid., III., lGl-3. 
Act of Fcbruapy 24, 1815; Statutes, III.' 213-G; mi;:ht 
be funded, non-interest-be~rinc notes in 7% stock, 
intoront-boaring notes in 6;-:; steel~.· 
Act of Doc. 15, 1814; $tatutes, III., 148-51. mnxos on 
( cont.lnv.ed). 
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on distillers, 20 cents per gallon on all liquors distilled, 
whether from domestic or from foreign materials; while the 
formwr licenses themselves were increased as well.~~ Addi-
tional revenue from three other sources was provided: (1) 
by a doubling of the former taxes imposed on sales at auction; 
(2) by a fifty percent increase in the postal rates; (3) by a 
fifty percent increase on the earlier duties on licenses to 
retailers in merchandise, wines, and spirituous liquors • .;:-7:-
Attempts at laying an income-tax and levying a tax on the legal 
proceedings of courts were frustrated by the Committee or Ways 
and Means refusing their sanction. ~Hm A second direct-tax 
was levied under the Act of January_9, 1815, for six 
millions of dollars, the enacting law providing for cer-
tain revisions in the details of administration set up by 
the old law of July 22, 1813 .~:- ·::- State assumption of 1 ts quota 
and discounts in the assessment in the case of prompt 
payments were allowed again. This law was repealled in 
December, 1817. Radical increases were made in the Internal 
Revenue System on January 18, 1815, by the enactment of 
laws laying taxes on various goods, wares, and merchandise, 
manufactured within the United States; on household furni-
ft.~ •••• 
";,· ... :-..: 
Statutes, III., 152-0. ~Hi- Ibid., III., 159-Gl. 
Bolles: Financial History, p. 258-0. 
Statutes, III., 164-80. 
( car!'iaccn and hnPnes::>es not used exclusively for 
hunbandry or transporto.tion of coods, on VD .. lun.tions ~) 
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ture and watches;~: and, by Act lbf February 27th, on manufactures 
• of gold, silver, plated wares, jewelry, and pastework.~H~ There-
~fter, the internal tax legislation was directed toward continuing, 
lowering, or repealing, the measures thus far enacted. 
As has been before-otated, the one 
hundred percent customs increase was actually set aside by the 
passage of the Tariff Act of April, 1816. On March 3, 1815, 
however, it may be noted, that an Act was passed, "to repeal 
so much of the several acts imposing duties on tonnage 
of ships and vessels, and on goods, wares, and merchandise, 
imported into the United States, as imposes a discriminating 
~l duty on tonnage, between foreign vessels and vessels of the 
United States, or between goods imported into the United States 
in foreign vessels and vessels of the United States. ".;HH:· 
• 
The postal increases were repealled in February, 1816;-::- -l:-
duties on manufactured goods, wares, and merchandise, and 
on gold, silver, and plated wares, in the same month.-:: -:~-::-
In April, those on household furniture and watches were, 
likewise, done away with. On April 19, 1816, duties on 
distilled spirits were abolished, and license taxes on 
distillers were remodelled.-::--::- .;:- The general law abolish-
~: stat. III., 186-02. ~~~=· Ibid., III., "-l"r • 
~~·::~~: .. Act Of T.Io.r~ 3, 1815; Statutes, III., 224. 
. ;:~ II II Fob • 1, 181G; II II 252. .. 
.. i( ·~: .. ~: II 
" 
II 22, 181G; II II 254. 
~~~: .. II 
" Jipr.l9, 
II II II 291-4. .. 
• 
• 
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ing internal taxation was passed on December 23rd, 1817, 
providing that, "from and after the thirty-first day of Dec-
ember, one thousand eight hundred and seventeen, the internal 
duties on licenses to distillers; on refined sugars; lic-
enses to retailers; sales at auction; carriages for the con-
veyance of persons; and stamped vellum, parchment, and paper, 
shall be discontinued; and all acts, and parts of acts, rela-
tive thereto, shall, from and after the said thirty-first day 
. of December, be repealled. "-:' The bill provided for the dis-
continuance of the internal revenue administrative system as 
soon as practicable. 
The following judgments have been 
passed on the financial operations of the War of 1812. "The 
financial policy of the war proved an utter failure. This 
policy was to supply war demands by employing the credit of the 
nation, and to support this credit from the receipts from 
the customs. These receipts were not adequate, public credit 
fell, nor was it revived until the passage of liberal laws 
levying internal taxes. Inadequacy of the custom~ in emerg-
ency is a general truth. --- A good revenue system, equal to 
all demands that may be made upon it, must be elastic, and 
a tax upon the processes of production, when laid in harmony 
with financial principles, is always more elastic than a tax 
on exchanges. Commerce is more sensitive to external conditions 
~~ Stnt11tca, III., 4 CJ f • 
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than ordinary production, the margin between success and fail-
• ure is narrower, and a tax or a war declared v;ill be more 
quickly reflected in trade than in domestic industries. It is 
indeed an unwise policy that would rely on customs alone. At 
least this is the lesson to be gleaned from the financial 
history of the second war i1ith England."~~ "The great blunder 
of Congress had been in delaying so long to- take the steps 
which were finally taken. Had the revenue on imports been 
increased at the time Gallati~ desired; internal taxation 
might have been avoided altogether; for enopgh money would 
have flowed into the treasury from importations to discharge 
• the ordinary obligations of the government, and the funds requir-
ed for extraordinary expenditure could have been easily and ad-
vantageously borrowed. But by delaying to tax, the credit of 
• 
the government was prostrated, and then there was no escape 
from increased taxation. In truth, Congress did not awaken to 
the seriousness of the situation until public credit was ruin-
ed, and until no money could be borrowed to carry on the govern-
ment. The path which Congress ought to have followed was as clear 
to Gallatin and some others, in the beginning, as it was to 
everyone at the end. By refusing to talte it, lamentable con-
sequences occurred, for which there was no excuse nor pallia-
~~ Adams: Taxation in the Unito0 Stntos, 1780-lOlG, pp. G0-70. 
·.:·,, Dalles: Fin8.ncin1 History, p. 200. 
• 
• 
• 
----~---~· 
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B. The emergency legislation of the Civil War: 
In many ways the conditions 
leading up to the Civil War were very similar to those in effect 
during the period previous to the War of 1812. By the tariff of 
1857 ,~~the customs rates had been reduced to the lowest point 
since 1815 ;~H~ and this, coupled with the reduction of imports 
attendant to the panic of the same year, resulted in a diminu-
tion of the federal income, to the extent that, late in 1857, 
it became necessary to provide for the treasury needs by an issue 
of treasury notes to the amount of $20,000,000 .~H:-·::· This indirect 
loan had to be supplemented in the following June by another 
loan to the same amount.·::· .;~ In December, 1858, Secretary of the 
Treasury Cobb advised a revision of the Tariff Schedule from 
the excessively low rates of 1857, so that more revenue sl1ould 
be derived from the customs service for the government,·:~ ~H:· As 
was the experience of Gallatin in the earlier days with the 
responses of Congress to the Secretarial advioes, the suggestion 
of Cobb Tias disregarded and no attempt was made to increase 
the federal revenues. By an Act. of March 3, 1859, ~H:· ~~ Congress 
authorized the reissuing, until July 1,. 1860, of the treasury 
..... , 
I• -' '~ 
Act of lbrch s, 1857, Statutes, XI., 192f. 
Tauc;;sic;: IJ:r~r-if:~.' History, 15'i'. 
D"'CCI'bOY' 2'=" S+" ... ,.l.t. e"" "~-1 2-7 
'-' '· - .;J ' u <4 L 1.. L , o ; .l'- t 1 0 • 
Act of Jtu1c 14, Ibid. 365 • 
Stc.te of Finru-Jcor., DoccrJbor, 185E, 7, Cobb. 
Statutca, XI., 430. 
• 
• 
• 
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notes circulating under the Act of 1857, since the government 
was unable to redeem them when they fell due. This postponement 
was not to any great avail, for at the latter date it was 
found necessary to fund them;-::- while an additional loan to 
the rumount of $21,000,000 bad to be authorized to meet the 
federal expenses~~:-.;;. Of this last loan $10,000,000 was subscribed 
for, when asked, at fairly reasonable terms. ~HH~ The financial 
situation of 1860, however, caused some delinquency in 
the payment of the sums subscribed, and for the balance 
Cobb urged Congress to empower him to issue treasury notes.~~ -::· 
By Ac~ of December 17, 1860,~l- .;;.-:: Congresc did make provision 
for an issue of such notes to the sum of $1o,ooo,ooo, to expire 
in one year. On February 8, 1861, an Act was passed authorizing 
the President to borrow to the sum of $25,000,000 before July 
lst;·:H<- ~'" and support was given to public credit by the passaee 
of the Morrill Tariff Act on March 2nd, increasing the rates .-:H:--::--::-
Very soon after, authority to borrow $10,000,000 more was con-
ferred on the President.-:: -::--::-~: None of this legislation may be 
~:- The unnn ture.lnoss of the situation is brouc;ht ot1t in 
Douoy's: Financinl History, 272-3, in an outline of tho 
current conditions throue;hout the country. 
~··;~ By Act of Juno 22, lf,GO, Statutes, XII., 79 • 
.;:--:r--::- For o. revie\7 of the ncc;otintions of this loan see tho 
nnnunl report on Ste, to of the Finances, l£C.O, 481-~5. 
~:- ·:r Ibid. g, bo.cl{cd by r:u .. clic 18.nds. · 
..;~~ ·::~ .. ;:.. Stn t"L1tcs, XII.: 121. ~:~~ ~:: .. Ibid., XI I., J~29 • 
~;-~; .. ;:~·;: Ibic1.: }~II. , , ~C·??; 
.. :~ -::~-::-::· .l\.ct of I·~2.l'Cll 2, 1861, $tatt1.ten, J~II., 178. 
• 
• 
• 
~~- ~ .. ·-------~---------_.;;;;::.._::::::::::::;;;=;;.;.;....------, 
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considered as part of the financial scheme of the war. It is 
given only to bring out the deplorable state of financial 
management on the eve of hostilities, conditions due to lack 
of economy in administration, extravagant treatment of public 
credit, radical diminution of the federal income, mistaken de-
partmental estimates, and the general unsettled political 
and financial situations. 
Abraham Lincoln, coming into office 
on March 4th, 1861, named Chase Secretary of the Treasury. On 
March 22, the new treasury head advertised a loan of $8,000,000, 
of which it developed that $3,099,000 was secured by loans, 
and the balance had to be issued in treasury notes.~:- the latter 
course being pursued under power granted to the President by 
Act of March 2, 1861 ,~;.-;:- to issue such notes in case subscription 
offers to loans were unreasonable. Sumter was fired upon on 
April 12th. Of a loan of $8,994,000, there was subscribed over 
an 85% minimum set, $7,310,000, the rest being raised by treasury 
note a • ·::--:H:· 
Congress met in special session on 
July 4th, 1861. The report of the Secretary of the Treasury,~:· -::· 
read at the opening of this session, in which Chase estimated 
the year's probable needs for revenue to be $318,519,518, out-
lined the financial policy for war to be as follows: that "to 
·::· fjcn. E::oc. Doc. (Spec. Dept.) no. 2, 37th. lst. p. 49. 
:::: Statutes, ):II., 170. -:~·::~:~ Scl1.F~:,:oc.Doc.Iro.2,3r/tl1,lot:,,lJ·ll. 
.. .. Special report on Str~ to of tho Finz.ncos, Ibid. 
•• 
• 
55/ 
provide for the large sume required for ordinary expenditure, 
and by the existing emergency, -- duties on imports -- will not 
be adequate. The deficiencies of revenue -- must necessarily be 
supplied from loans; -- not less than eighty millions of dollars 
should be provided by taxation, and -- two hundred and forty 
million should be sought through loans." He estimated that, 
with a few tariff changes, including duties on tea, coffee, and 
sugar, the existing laws would provide about $60,000,000 of the 
$so,ooo,ooo taxation demand, $57,000,000 from customs, $3,000,000 
from the sale of public lands; thus leaving $20,000,000 to be 
raised some other way. How the extra $20,000,000 was to be se-
cured, Secretary Chase left to "the superior wisdom of Congress" 
to determine. 
Having dealt thus far with the gen-
eral financial policy leading up to the Civil War, I propose, 
throughout the rest of this section, because of the immensity 
of the field, to confine myself to the provisions made in this 
emergency period for internal taxes, deliberately setting aside 
any further interest in the other great phases of the financial 
situation, the accumulation of the tremendous debt, the issuance 
of the enormous mass of legal-tender paper-money, and the innum~ 
erable variations of tariff schedule in session after session 
of change. 
"The weakest element in the fin-
anciering of the Civil War", says Dewey, in his Financial History, 
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,. "was the delay in applying effective taxation." Following the 
reception or Chase's report in July, 1861, Congress modified 
the customs duties to produce more revenue;~} established an 
income-tax to take effect on Jan. 1st, 1862, and providing a 
3.% return on all incomes over $800 ;~H: and apportioned a 
direct tax of $20,000,000, necessarily distributed among all 
the states, north and south alike .~H:-oi:· In his annual report 
in December, the Secretary had to revise his earlier estimates 
for the fiscal year 1861-2, increasing the expenditure esti-
~Ate and decreasing the income estimate; and,consequently, was 
e compelled to urge further increases to the tariff rates, re-
adjustoent of the direct-tax so that the loyal states should 
pay the entire $20,000,000 before apportioned; and the establish-
ment of an internal revenue system capable of supplying, together 
with the income-tax, $50,000,000 of revenue. The amoru1t that 
he dewanded in clear revenue from taxation and sales was not 
a sum too great, he declared, to meet "even economized disburse-
ments, and pay the interest on the public debt, and provide a 
sinking-fund for the gradual reduction of its principal." 
On January 21,1862, Congress 
instructed the Committee on Ways and Means to prepare a revenue 
bill adequate to produce $150,000,000 from taxation,-::· ~: and 
on March 3rd such a bill was introduced, calculated to yield 
~-il64,000,000 tax revenue, $114,000,000 from internal taxation.·::· "" 
It took three months to legislate the new provisions through, 
•• , J J. ~ ~, • 
-::- .t·ooG-DOvCS on lOJ.~.O~'i111C p:·.:_;o. 
•• 
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but they were finally enacted in the War Revenue Law of 
July 1, 1862,-::-~~ -::· and provided for additional taxation, as 
follows: On beer, ale, porter, and other malt liquors, $1 per 
bbl.; distilled spirits of 1st proof, 20 cts.; on individuals 
and corporations carrying on certain businesses, special licenses 
according to the nature and amount of business done; on all 
manufactures, articles, and products, specific or ad valorem 
duties were levied, the general rate of the latter being about 
3%; on auction sales, one-tenth of one percent; on carriages, 
yachts, billiard-tables, and plate, according to the descrip-
tion; on certain corporations -railroads and transportation 
• companies on gross receipts, -banks, trusts, savings, and 
insurance companies on dividends declared; by reduction of 
the income-tax minimum to $600, and change in the rates to 
3% under $10,000 and 5% over $10,000; on receipts from adver-
tising, 3%; on stamp taxes, 2 cts. to $20, on almost every 
transaction involving a document; by an inheritance-tax on 
legacies and distributive shares of property, according to 
the degree of consanguinity. 
Returns from the taxes imposed by 
the Revenue Law of July 1, 1862 were at first discouragingly 
meagre, the government income for the fiscal year 1862-3 
f1 . falling well under $40, 000, 000, -:~- leas than half the estimate. 
( .. ....... Stat. XII., 2D2. ~H~Ibicl. XII., 309-10, -:H:--::·Ibid. 28~5 . 
By r~ joint I\osolution, Sta. tuteD, XII., 612, Jo.n. 21st. 
· _, ·:~ .. ~~ Co11~, Glo1)0, 3?t,l1.2ncl., 10L10. ~: .. ~~ -:~ Stc1.tu.tes, 1:II. ,'-1'"\L. 
GcncPnJ. fit a tir:; tics oi' the Un:l ted Sta tos: Tiovonuc Cllc~rt. 
• 
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Regarding this bad miscalculation, Dewey says: "it was largely 
due to the unsettled condition of business as well as to the 
necessity of establishing at short notice an entirely new branch 
of treasury administration for the collection of duties."·::-
In 1863-4, however, the real returns began to come in, and, as 
Howe bring out, the same sources of revenue which supplied only 
$37,000,000 in 1862-3, yielded in 1863-4, $109,000,000, in 1864-5, 
$209,000,000,~H:- while the later increased revenue rates of 1864 
and 1865 yielded in 1865-6 1 over $300,000,000. In his annual 
report of 1863, the Secretary had stated in the face of the 
enormous public debt that was piling up, that "to check the in-
crease of debt must be, in our circumstances, a prominent object 
of patriotic solicitude." ~his uneasiness over the extension 
of public credit on so vast a scale was felt, also, by Congress 
to the extent that in June of the following year a s·econd great 
extension of the Internal Revenue System was effected.-::--::-·::· The 
Revenue Law of June 30, 1864 is named by Howe, "the most compre-
hensive tax measure in the history of our co1ll1try. ".;: 1:-
By the new measure a general increase 
in rates took placej increases from 60 cts. to $1.50 and $2.00 
per gallon on spirits were imposed; on tobacco from 5, 15, and 
20 c~s. to 25 and 35 cts.; on cigars from $1.50-$3.50 the rates 
·::- Pinanc:i.o.l Hintory: p. 302(5th). -!<-·:~ 5io.xa tion o.nd 
~:-~:-::- Stt:ltutes, WI .11.."2 3-5.D<>. 
II 11 II 
p,h'L. 
11, (, ~- • 
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soa~ed to $8.00-$40.00; license duties were increased and extend-
.• ed to new occupations; specific rates on some manufactures were 
doubled, and the general ad valorem rate was raised from 3% to 5% 
on most articles of the earlier schedule, while new articles 
were "ferreted-out" and added. Regarding this legislation, Howe 
says: "Nothing was omitted, from the raw product to the finished 
commodity. Often an article received half-a-dozen additions ere 
it reached the consumer. -- not only were all the constituent 
elements which entered into an article taxed, as the bolts, 
rivets, castings, trimmings, and the like, of an engine, but 
the engine when completed was subject to an ad valorem duty 
• upon its value; while all repairs which increased the value of 
an article 10 per cent. were rendered dutiable at a like rate." 
Chase resigned at the end of the fisval year 1864, and was 
succeeded by Fessenden as Secretary of the Treasury, who, in 
turn, was succeeded by McCulloch in 1865. 
As has been noted the returns from 
the Internal Revenue Service were constantly increasing, to over 
$100,000,000 for 1864, over $200,000,000 for 1865, and over 
$300,000,000 for 1866. Despite the increasing returns, Congress 
revised the system upwards by Act of March 3 1 1865;~rthe ad 
valorem rates on most manufactures being raised to 6%. This was 
• the final important revenue Act of the war period, and one of 
its provisions authorized the appointment of a special Commission 
to prepare a possible revision of the Internal Revenue Tax System 
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on the establishment of peace.·:~~:- Thereafter, the internal revenue 
:f measures were, in general, bills for the reduction and abolition 
of rates formerly imposed. The reductions made followed to a 
• 
considerable extent the recommendations offered by the Revenue 
Commission • .;:·:H:· 
Beginning with 1866 the important re-
ductions were made to the following approximations: 
Act of July 13, 
" " March 2 
. ' 
" 
11 february 
Acta of :Mar. 31 
1866-----------·----ostimated 
1867--------------- n 
3, 1868------------ " 
and July 20,1868--- " 
reduction , 
n 
tl 
$65 '000 '000 ~~ ~:· 
40, ooo, ooo-:~ -::-~:-
23' 000, 000~:--::· ·1:· 
es, ooo, ooo~:~ ·:~· 
Howe brings out that the actual reduction in revenue through 
these acts did not correspond·to these estimates exactly, be-
cause of the stimulation given to industry by the lower rates 
and consequent increase in output of the still taxable commodi-
ties over the former volume. The actual decrease through these 
acts he places at about $125,000,000.~H:·~H~ 
A recapitulation of the internal 
revenue receipts during the Civil War period may be taken from 
H. E. Smith's "The United States Federal Internal Tax History 
from l861to 1871", Appendix, Table XXIX., as follows(summariz-
ing the data there given, in terms of millions): 
(over) 
~:~: D. lt.. Ticlls, f~;to1Jl1on Col r;cll, rtl1d S. S. Hayes y;oro 
appointed to servo on this Corr.d1.H:::ion. 
~:- 4:~ .. ~: See nRepo1..,t of Ct CortuniBB:i.Olt O.J!po:l.tlted for a Rovis5-0I1. 
of the Ii.ovem.w f);;s tern of tho United States, 1865-66. 11 
~~ ·::- St:::.tutos, c.•v~. 1't-n 3 · -::- ·:H: Ibid. ,;v . ~'-{ . 
. ;;.;;. ·::- Ibid. '-17/·'f'ft)-. " .;~ 11 j'(. '?.C-bOi l'l.S-C..C. 
-::-::--::··~:· To.:~ a. t i or: o.11c1 Tc..:cc s : p • ~ f . 
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Subject 1863 1864 1865 1866 1867 1868 1869 1870 1871 Total 
---~---~-------------~-~---------------------------~~------~ Spirits--$5.1-30.3-18.7-33.2-33.5-18.6-45.0-55.6-46.2-$286.6 
Tobacco--·3.0--8.5-11.4-16.5-19.7-18.7-23.4-31.3-33.5-ll66.4 
Fer.Liq.-·1.6--2.2--3.7--5.2--6.0--5.9--6.0--6.3--7.3---44.6 
Bar~s----------2.8--4.9--3.4--2.0--1.8--2.1--3.0--3.6---24.0 
Stamps---w4.1--5.8-11.1-15.0-16.0-14.8-16.4-16.5-15.3--115.4 
Manu.~(--~17.2-36.9-74.-128.5-91.7-61.6--3.3--3.0--3.6--420.7 
Gro.Rcts.-1.6--3.4--9.8-11.2--7.4--6.2--6.3--6.8--2.8---55.9 
Sa1es------.o---.1--4.0--4.0--3.9--4.5--8.2--8.8--3.6---37.5 
Licen.~~*--4.7--5.2--9.8-14.1-13.6-11.8--9.9-11.0--5.0---85.4 
Income----2.7-20.2-60.9-73.4-66.0-41.4-34.7-37.7-19.1--356.6 
Legac.-----.o---.3---.5---.9--1.2-~1.5--1.2--1.6--1.4----8.8 
Success.---~~~~-~~~-~.o---.2--~.6--1.3-~1.~--1.4--l.o-~-~5.9 
Sch A.-----.3---.6---.7--1.6--2.1--1.1---.s---.9---.3----8.9 
Passp.~--~-.o--~.o-~-.o---.o---.o--~.o---.e--~.o---.o----~.1 
Sub.Bro.~--··-~-~---~~.o~-~.o---~--------------------------.0 
Southern-~----------1.9~--.o-----------------------------2.0 
Dir.Tax---1.4---.4--1.2--1.9--4.2--1.7---.7---.2---.5---12.6 
Penalt.----.o---.1---.5--1.1--1.4--1.2---.8---.8---.6----6.9 
------------------------------------------------------------
Totals--$42.-117.-214.-310.-270.-192.-160.-185.-144.-$1639.2 
------------------------------------------------------------~~ Hot including tobacco, snuff 2.nd cic;ru .. s. 
-::··::- " " licenses for r.u:..nufr~c turo n.r:d ::;o.lo of spiri tvou.s 
• licltJ.Ors and tobacco. 
Further study of the War Taxes of this period will be made 
in the next section of this paper. 
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c. The emergency legislation of the Spanish War: 
It will be remembered that in 
1897, the year previous to the outbreak of the Spanish War, the 
Dingley Tariff Bill had been passed, increasing the customs 
rates in many schedules. The changes that this bill wrought 
in the federal income would naturally be to increase the latter, 
not to decrease it; so, as far as current changes in the 
fiscal policy of the government were concerned, the financial 
legislation of 1898 may be assumed to be emergency legislation 
solely to meet extraordinary expenses occasioned by the war. As 
',f a matter of fact, the ordinary revenue and expenditures of the 
government for the fiscal year 1897 very nearly balanced,~; 
and the annual deficits which had appeared since 1894 bade 
fair to vanish, should a state of peace under the new schedule 
continue. We view, then, the legislation of 1898 in the 
light of its being of a purely extraordinary character. 
Relations between Spain and 
the United States regarding the condition of affairs in Cuba 
became strained in the early months of 1898. In March, when 
war seemed inevitable, Congress unanimously voted an appro-
priation of $50,000,000 "for the national defense" to be used-::-.;~ 
• "at the discretion of the President". At that time there was in 
the treasury of the United States the sum of $225,000,000, 
~~ 1897----·Rccciptn-0347,700,000; E~pcndituros-$365,800,000: Do~oy, 
-::--::- Sto.tutez, 'BEi. "'-('-\ . 
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but not all this was available for treasury uses. In his speech 
'9 introductory to the coming War Revenue Bill, Mr. Dingley went 
through this sum relentlessly, baring the real treasury balance 
available to meet this $50,000,000 at about $25,000,000. The 
treasury situation, as outlined b~ him in the House, was as 
follows: 
Balance in the Treasury---------------------$225,000,000 
Unavailable sums: 
Fractional currency, partly worn and unavail-
able, the rest subject to the demands for 
currency throughout the country-------------$ 13,000,000 
From sale of Pacific Railway, and held for 
the payment of $14,000,000 of Pacific Rail-
way bonds maturing January 1st next--------- 14,000,000 
In bank redemption fund, and subject to con.:..:>·~-: 
tinual drain for the redemption of national 
bank notes---------------------------------- 33,000,000 
Greenback redemption reserve---------------- 100,000,000 
Amount necessary for carrying on the work 
of government------------------------------- 40,000,000 
Total unavailable in the Treasury-----------$200,000,000 
Balance to meet $so,ooo,ooo appropriation 
of March 9th--------------------------------$ 25,000,000 * 
War was declared on April 25th, 
1898-. On the following day the Ways and Means Committee re-
ported into the House a Bill "to increase the internal revenue, 
and for other purposeo" ,.;H:- by which they proposed to provide 
additional revenue to ·the amount of $100,000,000 from inter-
nal taxation :tncreases·•!lThey.:meant to do this as follows: 
~~;_: -A:pJ:'Jl 8'?t't1, Congrcsslon-.:l.l Jecord, X.X:XI., 4207. :·::·:~. :· 
~~~::4 Record ;=~~,~J. • ; lt277. • 
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New tax Est. Rev. 
(.. One dollal'' per bbl-. additional tax on fermented 
liquors, estimated to yield an increase of---------$33,000 1 000 ~: 
Six cents per lb. additional tax on tobacco-------- 15,000 1 000 
Special tax of .~4. 80 per aru1um on dealers in 
tobacco and cigars--------------------------------- 5,000,000 
An increase of $1 per 1000 on cigars and cigarettes 5,000,000 
Stamp taxes on wines, mineral waters, and bovorgges, 
sold in bottles------------------------------------~~estimated 
An increase in tonnage of vessels engaged in for-
eign trade-------------------------·----------~----- 2,000,000 
Stamp taxes on docuruents, etc., patent medicines, 
etc., based on the law of 1866--------------------- 30,000,000 
Total--------#90,000,000 plus 
All these to.xes, it was brought out, were on objects which 
were assessed during or subsequent to the Civil War, with one 
exception; all were internal revenue war taxes, except the tonnage 
increase; they could be collected by the existing administrative 
system slightly extended; and they represented a scheme of taxation 
calculated to create the least disturbance to industry and trade. 
The measure, thus reported, was 
called up for general debate on April 27, under an agreement allow-
ing only three days discussion. In addition to its taxation in-
creases, the House Bill had provisions for loans and notes to the 
amount of $soo,ooo,ooo. Discussion on the bill in the House center-
around agitation for an income-tax of 3% with a $2,000 exemption 
mark,-:;;-:;. on certain corporation taxes, and on the issue of treasury 
notes. It was urged by the Democratic members that there be 
an issue of silver certificates to the full amount of the 
-:: Sl'..~ T~o.ry f:,Olt1 P. <1207-8 of Con,g. Record, XXXI. 
-::--::- The dincnscioi1 of the ':!:"'.r P.evonno BJ.ll in the House is 
covered i11 ::_;p. 489~")-:~.J::)CJ, Ibid. 
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seignorage on the .silver bullion in the treasur>y, and the coin-
age of silver dollars as fast as practict:!.ble for the redemp-
tion of such notes. The bill, however, passed the House little 
changed from the form in which it ·,vas introduced. The date of 
its passage was April 29th.·:~ 
The Revenue Bill was reported 
into the Senate by the Committee on Finance on May 12th,~:··:~ 
and it presented a very changed appearance from that pass-
ed by the House. The taxes on malt liquors and tobacco were 
retained, although the details were changed;;the stamp taxes to 
a considerable extemt held their own, though additions and 
amendments were freely added; a progressive inheritance-tax 
on personal property was introduced; the increased tonnage 
rates were eliminated, and were supplanted by special taxes 
on bankers, brokers, foreign insurance agents, theaters and other 
public exhibitions, bowling alleys and billiard halls, and a 
corporation tax on gross receipts for 1% to apply generally. 
~1e provisions for bond issue and temporary loans gave way 
to a provision for the coinage of $42,000,000 of silver, and 
the issue of silver certificates in advance of such coinage; 
authorization for the issue of $150,000 1 000 in greenbacks 
was also inserted.·::··::-·::· 
On the floor of the Senate the bill 
was forced to stand the onslaught of sectional opinion from 
jJy vo·~o of 171-J:~~=: Gon:-_;. :loc., ":'l:'J0. 
;~co Ibid. ~=:·,:r.: 4DGOff. 
:~lz.L::~~D.l":/ of Oi~.l ·:/itj1 I"e"'vOllll<; tJ~JLi~:··~~t.oG, n.ocol,.,cl, ~~9~30. 
<t 
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every direction, The corporation tax was restricted to petroleum 
and sugar-refining industries and to pipe-line companies, and 
an exemption minimum of $250,000 was set; the greenback propo-
sition was rejected in favor of a popular loan; silver certi-
ficates were to be issued only as the silver was coined; an 
import duty of ten cents per pound on tea was enacted; and·a 
tax on manufacturers and packers of mixed flour in propor-
tion to the amount produced was levied, in addition to a uni-
form tax on that industry. In all there were 213 amendments 
made to the House Bill when it finally passed the Senate on 
June 4th.·:~ Promptly the measure went to a Conference Committee.~H:· 
There most of the Senate amendments were agreed to, and the sil-
ver question was settled at the coinage of at least $1,500,000 
per month. The bill, reported back, was passed by the House on 
June 9 ,~:~:--::· by the Senate on June 10 ,~:- -::· and became law on June 
For convenience I have grouped the 
provisions of this bill as follows: (l)increases in excise rates 
on commodities already taxed; (2)specific taxes on corporations 
and individuals engagedr.:in certain businesses; ( 3) stamp taxes 
on docwnents of business and legal transactions; (4)new excise 
taxes on specified commodities and on gross receipts of certain 
industries; (5)tax on legacies and distributive shares of personal 
Hccord, 5!5-11. 
~3cn. AlJ.i::.on, t\lrlri0i1, tToncs; Roll• Din::;lc~r, T3'J .. ilcy, Payne. 
Hc'IJ'ord, 57~~7, vote lG4-107. ·:~ ~:- Record, 5749, votn •!:5-22. 
Stc..tutoo, :c:~c., J=·}8-·~?0; ':Tar l~cvcnnc L::>.::J of 18\HJ. 
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property. JL~ outline of the Tiar Revenue Law of 1898, arranged 
in these groups follows. 
Increases in excise rates on commodities already taxed: 
The internal revenue system at the 
beginning of the Spanish War comprised of three main groups 
of taxes, enumerated in Plehn 1 s study of the Spanish Tiar 
finances, as follows: (l)the spirits group, yielding in the 
year 1897, $82,008, 543; (2)the fermented liquors group, 
yielding in the year 1897, $32,472 1 162; (3)the tobacco group, 
yielding in the year 1897, $30,710,297 .~~ 
By the War Revenue Law of 1898, 
the duty on spirits was left untouched, thus leaving a 
very productive source of revenue in reserve for more criti-
cal future emergency. The duny on beer, ale, ponter, and similar 
fermented liquors, were increased from $1.00 per barrel to $2.00 
per barrel, with a discount of 7-1/2%. The increases in the 
tobacco group were as follows: on tobacco and snuff, 12 cents 
per pound; on cigars and cigarettes, weighing over 3 pounds per 
1000, $3.60 per 1000, weighing less than 3 pounds per 1000, 
cigars $1.00 per 1000, cigarettes $1.50 per 1000. 
Spec1fic taxes on individuals and corporations engaged in certain 
businesses: 
These were new taxes calling for 
specific annual payments of the enumerated sums by the individ-
uals and corporations named. The taxes were as follows: 
Plci1n: U::1ivorslty Cl:t'oniclo (Univ. of Co.l:i.fornin.), I., 4:l\J-G~5. 
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( ~ Bankers, $50 on first $25,000 of capital, surplus, and undivided 
profits, plus $2 per additional $1,000; brokers, $50; pawn-
brokers, $20; commercial brokers, $20; custom-house brokers, 
$10; proprietors of theaters, museums, and concert-halls, in 
cities over 25,000 population, $100; proprietors of circuses, 
$100, in each state were they perform; other public exhibitions, 
$10, in each state where·they perform; proprietors of bowling 
alleys and billiard halls, $5 per alley or table. Dealers 
in leaf tobacco and in manufactured tobacco, snuff, and cigars, 
~6-$24, according to the quantity sold; manufacturers and packers 
(~. of mixed flour, $12. 
Stamp taxes on documents of business and legal transactions: 
Under this head come the taxes enum-
erated under Schedule A. The telephone and telegraph message 
taxes were not, of course,collected by means of stamps, but 
were named in this schedule; so are included here. Schedule 
A provided the following duties: 
Corporate bonds, certificates of 
indebtedness, certificates of stock, except those of build-
ing and loan associations, 5 cts. per $100, or fraction there-
of, of par value; transfers of stock, 2 cts. per $100, or 
r fraction thereof, of par value; sales of products or merchandise 
' 
at exchange, 1 ct. per $100; bahk-checl~sr drafts, non-interest-
bearing certificates of deposit, time-orders, promissory notes, 
• 
--------------------------------------------------
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and domestic money orders, 2 cts. per $100, or fraction thereof; 
foreign bills of exchange, letters of credit, and other orders 
for the payment of money abroad, 4 cts. per $100, if drawn singly, 
2 eta. per $100, or fraction thereof, on each bill, if drawn. in 
sets; bills of lading and receipts from goods exported, 10 eta.; 
inland bills of lading, express receipts, parlor-car and sleeping-
car tickets, telegraph and telephone messages of over 15 eta. 
charge, 1 ct.; passage tickets to foreign ports, cost $30 or less, 
$1, cost $30-$60, $3, cost over $60, $5; charter party, $3-$10, 
according to the tonnage of the vessel; manifest for custon-house 
entry or clearance for foreign port, $1-$5, according to tonnage; 
bonds of indemnity, 50 cts.; certificates of profits or transfers 
thereof, 2 eta. per $100, or fraction; certificates and other 
documents issued by port wardens and marine surveyors, 25 cts.; 
other certificates required by law, 10 cts.; conveyances of real 
estate exceeding $100 in value, per $500, or fraction thereof, 
50 cts.; mortgage or pledge of real estate or personal property, 
or conveyance in trust as oecurity, on amounts from $1,000-$1,500, 
25 eta., per additional $500, 25 eta.; lease for 1 yr. or less, 
25 cts., for 1-3 yrs., 50 eta., for over 3 yrs., $1.00; brokers' 
notes and memoranda of sales, 10 eta.; entry at custom-house 
for consumption or warehousing, 25 eta. to $1.00-f entry for 
withdrawal from customs bonded warehouse, 50 cts.; life-insurance 
policies, 8 eta. per 0100 on amount insured, policies issued on 
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the indust~ial or weekly payment plan, 40% of first weekly 
payment, f~aternal beneficiary societies, farmers' local co-
operative companies, and employees' relief associations, exempt; 
fire, marina, and inland insurance policies, casualty, fidelity, 
guarantee policies, etc., 1/2% of the premium charged; power of 
attorney or proxy to vote at election of business corporation, 
10 cts.; power of attorney for other purposes, 25 eta.; protests, 
25 cts.; warehouse receipts, except for agricultural products 
deposited by growers for sale, 25 cts. 
New excise taxes on specified commodities and on gross receipts 
of certain industries: 
The group of taxes known as Schedule 
B are included under this head. These were stamp taxes on 
patent medicines and proprietary toilet articles and prepara-
tions, including perfumes, cosmetics, etc.;;the t~~es levied 
were as follows: 
Per packet, box, etc., of pills, powders, etc., of essence, ex-
. 
tract, etc., per retail value at 5 cts.~~~-~~--~~~~~l/8 cts. 
" " " " 10 " ----~--------2/8 " 
" " " " 15 n -~-----------3/8 " 
" " " " 25 n ~~-----~---~-5/8 " 
" additional 25 " --~-~~------~5/8 " 
On chewing gum, per box, carton, etc., retailing per $1.00,_4 cts. 
On sparkling wines, etc., per less than pint---------1 ct. 
' -" pint up----------------2 cts. 
On mixed flour, per bbl., and propotionally per fraction thore-
of, tax------~--~-----~-------------------------~~~--1 cts. 
On the gross receipts of petroleum and sugar-refining companies, 
';A 
, .. 
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and of pipe-line companies, annual receipts over $250,000, per 
surplus over $250,000--------------------------------l/4%. 
New tax on legacies and distributive shares of personal proper-
ty: 
The inheritance-tax under this law 
was a progressive tax on legacies and distributive shares of 
personal pnoperty, increasing in rate inversely with the near-
ness of blood-relationship, and it provided for an exemption from 
duty of estates not exceeding $10,000 in value; the rates were: 
Estate $10,000-$25,000: 
Direct heirs, brothers and sisters, descendants--- ... ------1%. 
Nephews and nieces, descendants----------------------:t-l/2% 
Uncles and aunts, first cousins, descendants-------------3% 
Great uncles great aunts descendants-------------------4% 
' ' 'rl Other relations, strangers in blood----------------------5~ 
Estate 
II 
II 
n 
$25,000-$l00,000-----1ncrease 
100,000- 500,000----- n 
500,000-1,000,000---- n 
over $1,000,000------ n 
rates 
II 
It 
n 
The surviving husband or wife was exempted. 
50% 
100% 
150~ 
200% 
This completes the summary of the 
taxes imposed under the War Revenue Bill of 1898; other pro-
visions of the same legislative measure, and which may be dealt 
with in rounding out the war policy of this emergency period, 
were (l)the levying of an import duty on tea, amounting to 
10 cts. per pound; (2)the authorizabion for a levy of $loo,ooo,ooo 
in~.tonpora;J;"y:.aoans; (3)the authorization of a bond issue to the 
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sum of $400,000,000; and (4)the provision for the coinage of 
(t silver bullion in the treasury to the amount of at least 
$1,500,000 per month.-:~ 
With reference to these, our interest 
centers on the third, the authorization for government bonds to 
the amount of $400,000,000. Immediately after the passage of 
the War Revenue Law on June 13th, the Secretary of the Treasury 
issued a circular-::-~: inviting subscriptions for $200 '000 'ooo~....pf 
the ~uthorized amount. In accordance with the provisions of the 
law, this circular stated that "all individual subscriptions 
for $500 or less will be allotted in full as they are received, 
<• --M!f the total sum subscribed for in amounts of $500 or less 
should exceed $200,ooo,ooo, the allotments will be made accord-
ing to priority of receipt---Allotment on subscriptions for 
over $500--will then be made inversely according to the size of 
the subscription--preference beine given to individual subscrip-
tions." Within a week two syndicate proposals were received 
covering the whole, or any part, of the issue, as might not be 
met by popular subscription; these came from J. P. Morgan and 
Company,-::--::-::· and from a group including the National City Bank, 
-,, '?.cs:poctivcly, f~cct. GO, Statutca, :C(X., 470; Sect. 32, p. •160; 
Sect, 03, p. 1G7; Sect. 31, p. 4G7. 
-::-·::· DoiJt.Ci:.".lro,lOl,Div.of I.o:mG n.nd Currency, .Juno 13, l8D8 • 
...... n--~1c·~e .... ,... ~ bill -' o "J:"'O"'id"' '"'~Y"' "·1cl ~-o'"''1'"' 1·0 ~,eo'· . .,~- ... o·· "n~·,···.; • I,[ · l ~...-.. U , J ~ • ..., \.J !) V _ '.J i'fl..~\ ' (.) t.J.1 1.,..;, l.i..t. ...:) \.J l.,.a, · ..., ¥t (..,4,.J. 4 "'-
l)Cncli ·~nrcG ll::;.s 'iJcon Tl:~o:;cd by Con.:::roso; J.nd 
··.::.:cJ.•o:'.G, In tl1e opinion of the unC:er:::;ic;nJd t21o. t, al t~1ou;:)1 
ti10 ni-:;oun·;, of.~orod ;·Jill bo 1"-lr.':;ol~/ ovor::;ubscrioed, it is 
ocsontinl that tho Gocretnry should be ncsurcd of tho abso-
ll:ttc, 1.mqur..lifiocl cuccccs of tllc is:;uc by an advance sub-
~_; cription or t:1o entire ucount; .:md 
~T.nor\JO.G, ii1 tho o::_;inion of the tmclol'::>i:_;nod, ~or ti.10 pur-
(. 
•• 
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the Central Trust Company, and Vermilya and Company, of New York 
City.~~ The reception given the loan was very favorable; the num-
ber of oubscribers was great, the sizes of subscriptions small, 
., 
' . " ' '. ' ' : ~ ... 
and only those of individuals were recognized. The totnl amount 
subscl'•ibed was announced as $1,325,000,000.~:-·::· 
:·oco of cnr~yin~ out t~oso ends, a syndicnto should bo forn-
od, ·~·;ho shall :1c;roc in advance ·::.o subflcribo u t prtl'' for ·::.:-.. o 
\7holo c.r.1omy~ of such isrme, two hundred nillion( :~;200, 000,000) , 
or sueh part thereof o.G L1flY not be cubscribecl for by the 
.::_;cnoral publtc. 
1Io11, therefore, Wo, the undersigned, r:...::;rce t,o accept fir~n 
p:'.Pticipc. tion .Ln cmy su.cil cyndica to to the e;~tcnt, of tho 
r;.i:1ount:; sot o.suinst ou1, n:.:~rJcs." 
Following Qn ezproasion o~ desire not to interfere in any 
uuy ;ri Lh the populn.r chaPac ten" of tho loc.n; <.tnd follo·:;i n_s. 
an onnr.1c1,a tion of the sovor:::.l members of tho Gynclica to ['.nd 
J-:.!10 m.1o1.mts aooic;ned to co.ch; tho lottor continuoo-
n On bollo.lf of such syndicd. te 110 therefore aubscribo at par 
:LoP tho ~7hole o.r.1ount of such issue, nay :::;200, 000,000, or 
such J.!O.rt, thol~oof e.G 1:1ay not be subscri bod by tho 130norul 
publir.." 
.--· .. ~ .. -- _ .......... - , ....... ·-------- .... _ ---- ... -------
Yours very truly, 
J. P. liorGan and Co. 
"ncforins to your clJ."cnln.r letter, in r~hic~1 you aslc for 
subscriptiono to 0200,000,000 United States 3 per. cent 
Goin bondo, rodemy,_ble n.ftor ton ~'CO.l'G and pa;,;ablo nftcP 
t~onty years, wo desire to advine you that ne ~tand roo.dy 
to au1Jscribo u.ncl. pay for ut par and accrued intcPoot .::m~r 
pOl'tion of tho bonds oL'orod that mr:..y not be aubscribed 
for b~r tho public." ':lcJ:on i'ron tho Ii'inanc J.a.l and Counorc io.l 
Cln,onicle, LZVI., llGO, Jc. 18, 1808. 
Ibid., :r.J.;:vrr., 02, Jy. lG, lBas. 
In spite of UicGc facts it in assePtod that the intention 
or Con:.:;roGs to l'J.a.1:o thir~ a popular lo2.n rmo not fulfilled. 
In its rcvio~ of the financi~l situation in its issue of 
July lGth, t£10 Chron1. c:lo aayo: 
"·;;c caimot hel·i') m:orof'J::>iw· rcr:rot foro tho misnor:10r invol-
.. .... \,_) ........ 
vcd in cr:.llins those nubscriptlons or:·orinss to a populo.r 
lo;1.11, o.s tl1ou~£h our people in what han boon dono ·.-rcPo i:iC..]~­
inc :: .. s:J.crifice fol, u. 1;rinci1~lo. --- 'l'ho oh1plo trutl1 i:-: 
'.:.~:::. t Con~~roco offered a lo:.:.n bolo~1 ito n::rJ:at v:1.lno and 
'-:.:1o shpo·.;d ''ml J-:.hr:i.fty :t.:.1onc our populu tion wore ·:iino 
tJnou.~11 t.o chip in r~nd t::.l:o it. -- Boo.r in mind then t!m t 
·!)10 onl:,r V~l'ty tho.t h::>.s · .. aclc a GClcrii'ico in this opol'stion 
5.::.; the :~;ovol'lLwnt, it haviw; don8.. tryl_ to tile su1n:cri ·nol'o 
G·JVOl'-:.'1 million <1o11rt:r.s; :fuPthol'r.1oro, t.ll;:-:.t ni th vo:,y for; 
•• 
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The effect exercised by the War 
' ~ ' 
. ,, 
Revenue Law of 1898 on the government income may be seen 
in a review of the federal receipts of the decade 1894-1903, 
as based on Dewey 1s tables:~~ (in millions) 
Year customs Int. Rev. Other Tot. Rev. 
1894 132 147 19 '298 
1895 152 143 18 313 
1896 160 147 20 .; 327 
1897 177 147 24 348 
1898 150 171 85. : 405 
1899 206 273 36 516 
l9QQ. 233 295 39 .., 567 
1901 239 307 42 588 
1902 254 272 36 562 ':' 
1903 284 230 45 560 
... 
,. ~' 
.. 
The emergency taxes were partially repealled in March, 1901, ~H: 
. . . 
exceptions the people ~1o have become the beneficiaries 
of this c;overmnont munificence he lone to: the clasrL pop-
uln.rly knorm ao \Tall Stroot sharlcs." 
Douoy, too, in hio Fihancial History, p. 467, questions 
\7hethcr the intentions of Congress wore carried out; he 
on.ys: 
'''l,he popular loan was floated at a probable sacrifice 
of about 05,000,000 rrhich r10uld have colile a.s a prooium 
fl''OrJ competitive bidding; and the theory that the dissem-
ination of governmental sccul"itios amonG the people 
would attach the holders thereof bf plosor bonds of sym-
pathy to the e;ovcriuaent, was weal::onod by the rapid sale 
of bonds at a small profit by the original subscribers •. 
Tiithin a feu months tho original holdings of about 
llG,OOO subscribers pasced into the posoession of a com-
p~rativoly fow persons and corporations." 
ne have, hor;evor, an onumor•a tion of facts by AGsis tant 
Secrctar•y of tho Treasury Vanderlip in the Forun of 
September, 1898, that is ·intcreoting. lie sa.ys: 
t.hat the hondo ·;rore issued in a popular cause, at a 
time \7hon money •,vas oaoy and socuri t,ios high.! and wo:t~o 
is :>ucd n. t par; t,ha t tho minim'U.Il was down to .-,;;20, with 
no restJ:•iction as to character of remi ttanco, no com• 
mision nor pl~emhun, no subscription from syndicate, 
corporation, or association; the largest accepted subscrip-
tion rms for 04,500, half the loan, ovo1~ ~100, 000,000, 
went t.o 230,000 people, each subscl~ibing ,;500 or less, 
the total mmber~:of subscr•ihors \7as 320,000. 
Doney: Financial History,t5th), pp. 474;494, 
Statutes, :;.coer., 938-050, :.rarch 2, 1901. 
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,. and were fully repeal led by Act of April 12th, 1902.-::-
Regarding tho fiscal operations 
of this emergency period, Dewey, in his Financial History of 
the United States(466), declares that nthe action of the 
treasury and of Congress----were alike commendable.n Plehn 1 s 
judement, as stated in his work on the "Finances of the 
United States in the Spanish Warn, is: "Not less creditable 
than the exploits of our army and navy was the general finan-
cial administration of the war. ---the general plan for the 
administration of the war is in almost exact accord with;.:;the 
• accepted principles of public finance. In this respect it 
forms a striking contrast to the fiscal management of any other 
war by the Unite~ States.n(419) 
-::- Statutes, :-cGCII., pp. 96-9 • 
• 
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n·. The emergency legislation of the European War: 
The situation this time was somewhat 
different from that existing in any of the previous emergency 
experiences of the country. We were not at war ourselves, but 
our commerce, hence, our receipts from the customs service, 
were being seriously affected by the foreign war enveloping 
almost the whole European continent. The emergency needs were 
not so extensive as if we were forced to meet war expenditures 
as well as revenue deficiencies, but the fact that the treasury 
receipts for August, 191~, fell below the treasury receipts for 
e August, 1913, by the sum of over eleven and a half millions,~: 
brought Congress face to face with the need of new taxes 
to meet the treasury obligations. On September 4th, the 
President personally appeared before a joint session of the 
two branches of Congress, to ask "that additional revenue 
of $100,000,000 be raised through internal taxes.".;;-:;., basing 
his demand on an assumption of the probability of a decrease 
of from sixt~r to one hundred millions of dollars for the 
year. 
It will be remembered that the 
European War came in a year when a transfer of political 
« control had wrought considerable changes in the system of 
record, lGGGl of LI., ~ucuat,l913,030,934,952; 1914,$19,431,3G2. 
Spoach in Con~. noc. LI., U4738. 
• 
• 
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federal revenues. The Underwood Tariff Bill, lowering the 
customs rates, had been passed and became a law on October 
3rd, 1913;·::- the resultant deficiency in the customs revenue 
was calculated to be offset by the returns from the income-
ta."t included in the tariff measure ,-:H!- and rendered constitutional 
by the recently adopted amendment. Early treasury receipts(Nov-
ember, 1914)indicated that the income-tax revenue would not, 
presently at least, make up for the customs deficit,~~·::-~:- and 
in the debate on the Tiar Revenue Bill of 1914~: -::- ample oppor-
. 
tunity was afforded for much Republican criticism of this 
Democratic financial management. It is not a part of this 
study, however, to ascertain what elements of truth were in-
volved in these party assertions and denials. The point of 
interest here is that during the months of the latter half 
of 1914 the federal revenue began to fall off from the 
estimated and needed amount, and the neces.sity for providing 
additional income for the purpose of carrying on the work of 
government became urgent. 
On September 24th, 1914, the 
War Revenue Bill came before the House for its consideration. 
At its entry the Committee on Rules submitted a privileged 
report, resolving: that the bill should be considered at once, 
and should be the the continuing order of the House until 
disposed of; that general debate on the measure should be restrict-
~.· ;~_t8. t, ~::::.VIII., I., lli!-20~~. .... Ibid, Sect. II., lGG-181. 
-::-·::-:: ~c·::c~r: Fin:.;.nc:t::-,l1Iic.J.:.oi':/, 1:00.·::· -::· Stc:.t. :::::VIII., I., 7 115-Gr~. 
• 
• 
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ed to seven hours, that thereupon the previous question should 
be. moved, and the bill voted on.~: This resolution was adopted 
by the House after much sarcastic criticism from the Republican 
side regarding the practise of gag-rule powers by the majority 
party .. ::--::- The bill was presented at once, and was passed on the 
following day.-::--::--::- The House Bill·::- ~" provided for an increase 
of the excise tax on beer, ale, porter, and other fermented liqours, 
from $1.00 to $1.50; new duties on the manufacture and sale of 
wines, 12-20 cents per gallon; taxes on producers of gasoline, 
motor-opirits, naphtha, etc., 2 cents per gallon. Special taxes 
were imposed on bankers, brokers, pawn-brokers, commercial 
brokers, custom-house brokers, proprietors of tneaters, etc., 
proprietors of circuses, and other public exhibitions; and on 
proprietors of bowling alleys and billiard halls, per alley 
or table. Taxes were imposed on dealers in leaf tobacco, 
$6-$24, according to their sales; on dealers in manufactured · 
tobacco and cigars, $6-$24, according to their sales; and on 
dealers in cigarettes, $24. Schedule A, including stamp taxes 
on documents of business and legal tl"'ansactions was added. 
The bill was reported into the 
Senate by the Committee on Finance carrying several suggested 
amendments, most of which were passed and incorporated into 
Jlouco J:.orfolution, G2D; .I1ccord, J.JI., l5G41. 
?p. lGG,H-5 pru;:;ont oouo c110ice olloto of partisan cl'i ticisn 
of tJ:o L1CJ.:.hoclo u.Gr.)cl in ".:.his ci tuation. 
Eo cord, l!)7r/~~. .. .. Ibid. l5G48-51. 
• 
• 
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the final Act. The Senate changed the increase of the tax on 
fermented liquors from $1.50 to $1.75;~; substituted for the House 
provision of wine-duties of 12-20 cts. a duty of 8 cts. a gallon 
on wines, and 55 eta. a gallon on brandy used in the fortification 
of wines; and struck out the taxes imposed by the House on 
gasoline, motor-spirits, naphtha, etc, The special tax on bank-
ers was reduced from $2 per $1,000 of capital employed to $1 
per $1,000 of-capital employed. The maximuc of $24 pnrdealers 
in manufactured tobacco, cigars, and cigarettes, was raised to 
$2496 by a new schedule of assessment. The special taxes on 
theater proprietors were to be assessed on the capacity of the 
theater, rather than on population of the community operated 
in. In Schedule A, a House provision for a tax of 8 eta. per 
$100 on life insurance policies was struck out, as was one of 
25 cts. per $1,000 over $1,500 on mortgages. The Senate, also, 
inserted Schedule B, providing stamp taxes on per~ery, pro-
prietary articles, chewing-gum, etc., the former at a rate of 
5/8 cts. per 25 cts. retail value, the latter at the rate of 
4 cts. ·per $1,00 retail value. The bill passed the Senate on 
October 17th,·::--:: and went, after a temporary consideration by 
the House Vlay:s and Means Committee, to a Conference Committee .~~·:H:­
Aside from the acceptance of the House tax of $1.50 on fermented 
liquors, the report of the conferees followed the Senate 
Son~tc Docunont, 597, G3rd.2nd., ia n compar&tivc print 
of H .R. 18¢301, gi 'linr; the bill, o.s pas :Jed by the Houso, 
:~s roportr)cl -::,o the Scn:::.tc, :~nd c.;:; ::.;!1~_ct,)d into Lo.w. 
~ccord, LI., lG207. 
;:;on. ;;i; :.:..~one, 8 (.one, ·::illi:'.i.:s, : :cc-..~_l::ool', Cl.:.:.rt; .aop. Un.cloPi7ood, 
:;:~i tchh:, ?c.~:no. 
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.• measure almost precisely.-:~ The Conference report was agreed to 
by the House and by the Senate,~and was signed by the President 1 
on October 22nd. 
• 
• 
The bill, as it left the House, car-
ried approximately $105,000,000; as it came back from the Senate, 
it carried ~107,000,000; as reported by the conferees, it carried 
about $90,000 1 000. The original estimate of the President of 
the revenue required was for $100,000,000; the final reduction 
of this amount by $10,000,000 was agreed to by the President 
for the sake of getting the Revenue measure speedily enacted •. ;:-.;~ 
The provisions of the War Revenue 
Law of 1914 ,~:--::-·::- may be grouped under the following headings; 
(l)excise taxes on distilled and fermented liquors; (2)special 
taxes &n individuals and corporations engaged in certain busi-
nesses; (3)exc1se taxes (a)on certain documents of business 
and legal transactions, and (b)on certain specified commodities 
of Schedule B. 
Excise taxes on distilled and fermented liquors: 
' 
Still -------~~----~ 1 ct. wines, per pt.------------------- 2 cts. 
" " " --------------------qt.------------- 8 n 
n n ----------------gal.---------------- 5 n 
Sparkling wines, per 1/2 pt.---------------:::::::::: 10 " 
" " n " --------------- 0 " 
________ ..... 2 
t ------------- I " q .--~- t ------------1-l 2 Li 1 2 p ........ -- n queurs- cordials-etc •• per • ---------- 3 n 11 n ' n pt.------- 6 n ________ ,..._ 
n n n n qt.-------- 24 n _________ ..... 
n n n n gal .......... --- 55 " f rtification,gal. 150 " 
Grape-brandy and wine-spirits, ror--~----------------
Fermented liquors, per bbl.------- .,.," 
'· .~ ~~ + in nocord' 1C0.;a • 
1) d Ql! 0 1.12. v(,L1011 V T:cc:ord, lG00C.-0. :·.:·: .):;.so 
-::··::--::· r:;-:-., .• ,,~<,.. ~.-,--<nrl--I I.·,···74I'i-G1. ~ VI. .llt..:.GC~.}' __.1.-t' .... ll..V .J .... , 
" 
II n II 
l 
• 
• 
• 
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Special taxes on individuals and corporations engaged in certain 
businesses: 
Bankers, per $1,000 capital employed, $1; brokers, $30; pawn-
brokers, $50; commercial brokers, $20; custom-house brokers, $10; 
commission merchants, $20; proprietors of theaters, museums, 
. ~ 
concert-halls, etc., seating capacity -250----------------~25 
-500-~-------------- 50 
-800-~--~----------- 75 
over 800----------w-----100 
proprietors of circuses, $100; proprietors of other public ex• 
hibitions, $10; proprietors of bowling alleys and billiard halls, 
$5 per alley or table; dealers in leaf tobacco (exempt if sales 
under 1000 lbs., annual sales -50000 lbs.-----------$ 6.00 
II II 
-100000 " ----------- 12.00 
" " over 100000 " ----------- 24.00 
dealers in manufactured tobacco(exempt if sales are less than 
$200), $4.80 per store, shop, etc.,(applies to dealers not other-
i7ise covened by the Act); manufacturers of tobacco, according 
to their sales, annual sales -100,000 lbs.---$ 6 
" 
n 
-200,000 " 12 
" " -400,000 
n 24 
II 
" -1,000,000 " 60 
" 
n 
-5,000,000 " 300 II n 
-10,000,000 " --- 600 
" 
II 
-20,000,000 II 1200 
II II over 20,000,000 , 2496 
nanufactures of cigars, 
annual sales -100,000 lbs.---$ '% v 
" " 200 ,000 " 6 ---Ill! 
" 400,000 II 12 II II 1,ooo,ooo II 30 
II II s,ooo,ooo 
" 
150 
II 
" 20,000,000 " 600 
__ ... 
II II 40,000,000 II 1200 
II 
" over 40 1 ooo,ooo " 2496 
---, 
• 
• 
• 
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~anufacturers of ciearettes, 
annual sales .:,1,000,000 cig.----$ 12 
" " -2,000,000 " ...... -... 24 II It 
-5,000,000 It 60 
II n 
-1o,ooo,ooo II 120 
It It 
-50,000,000 It 600 
It It 
-100,000,000 II 1200 
II It over 100,000,000 It 2496 
Excise taxes: on certain documents of business and legal trans-
actions: 
Bonds, debentures, certificates of indebtedness, per $lOOr--5 
Certificates of stock, orieinal issue, per $100-------------5 
II " " t f n rr ~ rans ers, -------------~ Sales of products at exchange, per $100----~----------------1 
Promissory notes--------------------------------------------2 
Bills of lading, manifests, etc., express cos.--------------1 
Bonds, except required by legal process--------------------50 
Certificates of profits-------------------------------------2 
II II d na::": arnaee-------------------------------------NV 
11 11 other sorts-----------------------------~--10 
Brokers' contract--------------------~---------------------10 
Conveyance, over $100, per $500----------------------------50 
En~ry of goods at custom-house, per valuation---------~25-100 
for withdrawal from ware-house-----------------------50 
Insurance: m~rine, inland, fire, per $1 premium-----------1/2 
" fidelity, guaranty9 per $1 premium-------------1/2 
Passage ticket to foreiEn port, per valuation-----~---100-500 
Power of attorney to vote---------------------------------10 
11 
" 
11 
' to sell---------------------------------25 
Protest of note, check, etc.-------------------------------25 
Telephone and telegraph calls, over 15 cts. charge----··-----1 
Parlor-car and sleeping-car tickets-------------------------1 
Excise taxes: on certain specified conmodities of Schedule B: 
Perfumeries, cosmetics, etc., per 
retail value 
packet, box, etc., 
-5 cts.------1/8 
lfll II 
II 
II 
II 
" II 
" per 
Chei7ing-gum, per packet, box, etc., 
retail value 
11 n per 
-10 " -- ....... --2/8 
-15 rr ------3/8 
-25 If ------5/8 
25 " ------5/8 
$1-~------~~--~~ l-.. -... ---------4 
eta. 
II 
II 
II 
" 
cts. 
II 
cts. 
" II 
ct. 
cts. 
ct. 
cts. 
n 
" II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
II 
" 
" It 
Tr 
ct. 
II 
The taxes imposed by the Tlar Revenue Lau of 1914 were to continue 
• 
• 
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in force until January 1, 1916. By a later Act they were 
continued beyond that point.,:· 
The historical presentation of the 
emergency taxation e::cperiences of this country, as dealt with in this 
paper, ends here, with the war taxes of 1914 still in force, the 
Europonn War continuing indefinitely, and rumors circulating of 
a possible further extension of the federal taxation system 
to meet the expenses of the currently advocated measures for 
military and naval preparedness • 
------------------------------------------------------------~------------·~ 
• 
• 
• 
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III. 
CRI'fiCISM 
Regarding particular tm:es in the scheme of emergency 
taxation: 
In this section I propose to study more 
in detail some of the particular taxes that have entered into 
the emergency taxation schemes in the past history of this 
country, tracing the development of each l~ind of tax consider-
ed, measuring its productiveness and discussing the effects 
of its working. The taxes to be so dealt vri th may be enum-
erated, as follows: (l)taxes on spirituous and fermented liq-
uors; (2)taxes on manufactured goods and products; (3)taxes 
on gross receipts of certain corporations; (4)stamp taxes 
on documents of business and legal transactions, on proprietary 
articles and patent medicines; (5) special taxes on individuals 
and corporations engaged in certain businesses; (6)taxes on 
legacies and distributive shares of property; (7)taxes on in-
comes. 
• 
• 
• 
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Taxes on spirituous and fermented liquors: 
Howe, in his study of Taxation 
and Taxes in the United States under the Internal Revenue Sys-
tem, ~akes the following statement with reference to the his-
tory and practise of taxation upon distilled and fermented liq-
uors: "The well-nigh universal experience of foreign states, 
the more recent history of our own excise, as well as the de-
mands of social, economic, and fiscal considerations, unite 
in admitting distilled spirits to be a most proper object of 
taxation. First employed in England by Charles II., taxes 
on spirits have since become one of the most considerable 
sources of revenue in nearly every civilized state. At the 
present time nearly all the German States, Russia, France, 
Great Britain, Italy, Austria, Spain, Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Turkey, Denmark, and Portugal tax this article in some form 
or other, while in the United States the internal taxes alone 
on whiskey produce nearly one-third of the entire revenue 
from the customs and inland duties.""~ The first tax on spirit-
uous liquors in this country was the excise taR of Hamilton 
in 179l,·:H:· a duty of ll-30 cents per gallon being assessed 
according to proof on spirits manufactured from foreign mat-
erials, that is, from molasses, sugar, and the like, of 9-25 
cents per gallon on spirits manufactured from domestic mater-
·~;· ,Tc..:~n.ti011 [trld Tn::cs: r·. l3C. IIistOl'~iC~'·.l ci.C" .. "Clorin:Ol1t of 
ti.lir:; ta:: :i.n Finr:.n.s f,l'chi v, lEC?, i!ie J;rnut.weinctouol', 
f) I"". J. ":~-;·o J.f. 
.. .. J ct o::::· I:c.rch :::; , l?~Jl, r;tatutor., I., 2C2-3. 
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ials, such as whiskey from grain; this tax was to be paid or 
4t secured prior to the removal of the product from the place 
of manufacture. To country distillers the option was granted 
of paying a yearly duty of sixty cents per gallon on the 
capacity of the stills or of paying nine cents per gallon 
on their verified output. This Act is of no special interest 
other than historically, so I will not regard the amendments 
made to it; the Act was repealed in 1802 by the Jeffersonian 
Party.~~ OUr next experience in the taxation of distilled 
spirits was during the period of the War of 1812, .;H~ when a . 
license tax was imposed upon distillers to be assessed accord-
• ing to the capacity of the still, duration of operation, and 
kind of materials used. ~:-.;H:-This Act was repealed in 1817 together 
with the other internal duties of the war period.-::· .;:- In the 
bill reported into the House of Representatives by the 
Tiays and Means Committee on March 3, 1862,-:: ~:--::· a tax of 15 eta. 
per proof gallon was proposed.-::--::- ~:- This represented a tax of 
about 100% on the cost of manufacture. On spiritD rectified 
for drinking purposes an additional tax of 25 cents per gallon 
was suggested.-::- .. The bill was passed by the House, levying 
a tax of 15 cts. a gallon on spirits, but varied the rates on 
the rectified product so that the additional tax on whiskey 
e was 15 cts. pep gallon, on brandy, rum, gin, and wine, 30 cts • .;~·::--::--::· 
The Senate Finance Committee, in reporting the House Bill into 
• 
• 
• 
87/ 
the Senate, proposed that the tax on raw spirits be made 20 cts., 
and that the additional tax on spirits to be used for drinking 
purposes be eliminated.~:· -::-.;:-::- On the floor of the Senate, the 
20 cts. tax on raw spirits was enacted, but an additional tax 
of 10 cts. on the rectified product was also passed.~H:· -::--::· In 
the Conference Co~~ittee, the House conferees assented to the 
20 eta. tax on raw spirits, with the understanding that the 
rectified article should bear the same rate ;·:H:-.::- ~~accordingly, 
the law was finally drawn up to provide that after August lst, 
1862, an excise tax of 20 cts. per gallon would be levied on 
spirits of first proof; license taxes were also imposed by 
this Act on distillers, rectifiers, wholesale and retail 
liquor dealers.~:· ~:·~:- Throughout the course of these legislative 
steps, the question as to whether the tax should apply to 
spirits in stock as well as those distilled after the passage 
of the Act, and it was determined that the tax should not apply 
to other than spirits currently distilled. This decision led 
to much confusion in the course of events, through the attempts 
of producers legitimately to avoid the tax. In his annual report 
in December, 1863, the Internal Revenue Con~iasioner suggested 
.... :·. ;"; .~ 
• # • ~ 
. . ~ ... 
.. . . . . . ~ 
~ -... - .. 
". ~· . . . . 
St~tutos, II., 148. 
i' c ·:c 1' ' C) 1' t..o ..... 
.. _ .... ~ l- r•-r~ :P• 
Globc,37th.2nd. l3C8. 
11 11 11 1t1::J£J, 
fl 
11 II 
II 
II 
2283. 
2GC>O. 
Ibid.: III., 42. 
:::.t~. tn::.os, II I., 401. 
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Ibid., l-'13G • 
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that the tax on spirits should be increased at least to 60 cts • 
This suggestion was adopted by the \lays and Means Committee, who 
framed and reported into the House a bill to that effect. The 
House voted this measure through and even went so far as to 
have the tax apply to spirits in stock, since the manipulation 
of production had been so evident as to cause quite a stir.;~ 
The Senate promptly turned down that levy against spirits in 
stock, but provided for future increases in the spirits duty, 
as follows: from the date of the passage of the bill till .ruly 
1, 1864, the tax would be 60 cts. per gallon; from July 1, 1864 
to January 1, 1865, 70 cts.; and from January 1, 1865 on, 80 
cts.~n: In Conference, the House accepted the elimination of 
stock spirits·:~·::·~~ taxation, but refused to accept the Senate 
provisions for future increases in rates; so the Act wass passed 
providing that the tax on spirits from March 7th to tuly lst, 
1864, should be 60 cts.* * 
A bill for the general revision 
of the internal revenue laws was reported soon after this 
increase in the spirits tax, and several very radical changes 
in the liquor taxes were included. By this Act of June 30, 1864,~~ -iH:· 
the spirits duty was made $1.50 from July 1, 1864 to February 1, 
1865, thereafter $2.00. On brandy distilled from grapes, an 
additional tax of 25 cts. was imposed.-::--::· ·::· The date of the levy-
ing of the ~2.00 tax was changed from February 1st to January lst 
in accordance with a request for such action from the Commissioner 
of Internal Revenue.-:: -::- By another bill the additional tax on 
• 
• 
• 
89/ 
grape brandy was increased from 25 cts. to 50 cts., while on 
apple and peach brandy a tax of $1.50 was levied.~~-::--::-·::- When the 
high tax on spirits had been in force over a year, the Special 
Revenue Commission made a report to Congress on "Distilled 
Spirits as a Source of National Revenue". This report presents 
the results of very careful and extensive investigation of 
the matter.~:. ~:-~:--::· This Commission came to the conclusion that 
"in a revenue, industrial, and moral point of view, it would 
be expedient to reduce the existing e;wise of two dollars 
per gallon on distilled spirits, and to substitute therefor 
a lower rate of one dollar per proof gallon." By Act of July, 
1866, however, the $2.00 rate was continued, and new duties of 
$3.00 per dozen bottles were placed on wines in imitation of 
champaien, for bottles of less than a pint, $6.00 per dozen 
bottles over a pint.·::-..;: -::--:r The $2.00 tax ·was again continued 
by Act of March 2, 1867, and the grape brandy tax was raised 
to $1.00 per gallon.-::--::-~:· ~: Soon after it vvas seen that to keep 
up this high rate would be disadvantageous from a revenue point 
of view, and the House passed a resolution reading: "Resolved, 
that in the judgment of this House it will inflict serious loss 
upon the national revenues to delay the revision of the taxes 
··• Globe, 38th.lst., 218. 
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on distilled spirits and tobacco until the same can be accom-
plished by a general revision of the entire internal revenue 
system; and the Committee on Ways and Means is hereby instructed 
to report without delay a separate bill for the revision of 
the taxes on the manufacture and sale of distilled spirits and 
tobacco • 11 ~<- A bill was accordingly presented reducing the $2.00 
tax to 60 cts.: increasing the license tax, and levying a per 
diem tax on distilleries.-::-~:- The House Ill.ade the rate 50 cts., 
and the Senate concurred~ a special tax of ~4.00 per bbl. 
was levied; a per diem tax of $2.00 per 20 bu. or per 60 e;al. 
capacity of stills was imposed· • .;;..::--::· This reduction may be con-
zidered as the ending of the war legislation on this commodity. 
The receipts from the taxes on 
spirits from 1864-70 were as follows: 
Year Rate Revenue 
1864 2octs;60cts. $28,431,797 
1865 $1.50;$2.00 15,9~5,701 
1866 12.00 29,198,578 1867 2.00 28,296,264 
1868 2.00 13,419,092 
1869 50 cts. 33,225,212 
1870 50 cts. 38,633,184 
In their special report on distilled spil"i ts the Revenue 
.. 
Commission said: "That distilled spirits can, furthermore, 
without detriment to any business interests of the cotmtry, 
?Z.. 
41 be made to yield a revenue sufficiently large to lighten the 
burden of taxation on almost every other branch of industry, 
1 s an assertion tha. t seems scarcely to need proof.".;: -::·~~ 
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However, t.he need of discrimination between excessively high 
rates and low returns and moderately assessed duties and 
considerable returns is the lesson lear•nt from the above 
figures. ].iuch of the defection accompanying the levying of 
these duties was due to the failure to tax spirits in stock 
as well as spirits currently manufactured. The low taxes at 
the start,followed by inevitable hieher rates, instigated 
a manipulation of production so that the industry experienced 
fits and starts of prosperity and depression, shifting of 
capital, booms and shut-dom1s, the bane of labor. It is 
difficult to l'eason out how, as was asserted, the extension 
of the tax to spirits in stock would have been inquisitorial 
against the producers, for the burden of the tax was shifted 
onto the consumer entirely by rise in prices. F~empting 
spirits in stock, on the other hahd, played directly into 
the hands of speculators, besides placine a premium on 
fraud by opening strong temptation to distillers, dealers, 
and revenue officers. As a fair object of taxation spirits 
stand out in the van of most other cornn1odities, They are 
clearly subject to what is known as intc11Se consumption, that 
is, tbe demand is compartively constant and not so elastic as 
to quickly follow prices. In the opinion of Howe in this 
mattel'', the rate of duty, though someuhat reflected in consump-
tion, does not act in any fixed ratio in that direction·; more 
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prominent than any change in consumption when this commodity 
~ is taxed excessively high, is the danger of fraud and evasion 
of the tax.·::· 
Turning to Howe for the peace 
developments in the taxation of this commodity, we find that 
from 1868-72, while the 50 cts. tax was in force~ t.here was an 
annual production of about 67,000,000 gallons of spirits, and 
an average annual revenue of $34~000,000 therefrom. In 1872, 
the spirits tax was centered upon a raw spirits duty of 70 cts. 
per gallon, the per bbl. and capacity taxes being repealed. 
In 1875, the tax was raised to 90 cts., in 1894, to $1.10. 
Spirits were untouched in the emergency plan for the Spanish 
War, and in the European War period the only taxes on distilled 
spirits were those on certain• oottled wines • .;:- -::--:~ 
The Civil War tax on fermented 
liquors was made $1.00 per bbl. of 31 gallons by Act of July 
1, 1862.-::--::· This Act was in force less than a year, when, by 
Act of March 3rd, 1863, the tax was lowel"ed to 60 cts .-::--::--::· 
After April lst, 1864, the $1.00 rate prevailed again, and 
was continued by Act of June 30, 1864 and of/July 13, 1866,-::- .. 
so that the tax has been permanent at that rate. The variations 
during the Spanish and European Wars to $2.00 and $1.50, respec-
tt tively, have been noted. The opinion is expressed by H. E. Smith, 
in his study of the Civil War taxes, that the relatively high 
duties imposed on spirits distilled as compared with the rela-
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tively low duties imposed on duties fermented did not nee-
~ essarily exercise the effect, nor explain the fact, of the 
increasing consumption of the latter.~:-
Taxes on manufactured goods and products: 
Taxes on manufactured goods 
and products uere a new experience to this country during the 
Civil War period as far as their existence as a federal excise 
was concerned; they had, however, been levied in some of the 
states~ The policy adopted at the beginning of the war with 
reference to the mode of taxation upon this source renders a 
detailed study of them almost impossible within limited space. 
>· 
• That policy Tias to levy taxes at low rates on an enormous 
number of commodities; rates specific or ad valorem were imposed 
according to the nature of the article taxed; while , by Act 
of July 1, 1862, a general omnibus clause provided an ad val-
orem rate-::--:' of 3% on all manufactures not specially dealt 
with. There were constan~ alterations to the schedule. The 
e;eneral rate was raised by Act of June 30, 1864,-::--::-~: by about 
a general increase of about two-thirds being made in all 
the taxes in this line. Another general increase of about 
20% in 1865 brought the ad valorem rate to 6%; so that Howe 
says: through repetition of taxation the government levied from 
It 8-15% on cost on nearly all rranufactured articles, while in 
some cases as high as 20% .·::· .. 
I11tu1')rt>l '?~~.:: T~j_;~ J(.O~-~:·: }~l , 28i~-3. 
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The tobacco taxes, because they 
remained a part of the permanent system, are of especial inter-
est. By Act of July 1, 1862, the tax on chewing tobacco': 
was set at 10-15 cents according to the value per pound; in~:··::· 
June, 1864, this was raised to 35 cents; in March, 1865, to 
40 cents; and was reduced in July, 1868, to 32 cents. On 
smoking· tobacco a tax of 5 cents was imposed in 1862; raised 
to 25 cents in 1864; 35 cents in 1865; repealed in 1866 and 
placed at 40 cents under a new classification; reduced to 
16 cents in 1868. On cigars the first tax was from $1.50-
$3.50 per 1000 according to value; in 1864 these rates were 
changed to from $8.00-$40.00; in 1866 to $2.00-$4.00; and 
were repealed in 1867, a tax of $5.00 per 1000 being levied 
thereafter. Cigarettes were assessed $1.00 per 100 packages 
in 1864; 5 cents per package in 1865; thereafter as cigars. 
The tobacco taxes of 1898 and 1914 on dealers have been 
given.· . .-· . .-· . .- Other commodities of the Civil Viar schedule yield-
ing large revenue from this source were those on cotton-cloth, 
woolens, clothing, raw cotton, boots and shoes, furniture, 
and leather.-::· -::· The enormous revenue from manufactures has 
been already referred to."· ~:-~~ 
These taxes on manufactures, of 
course, affect more than any others the conditions of business 
and commerce. A.side from their productiveness, the arguments 
submitted must be against the advisability of their levy. They 
lead in a general way to a rise in prices on the articles 
• 
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affected, increase the incentive to speculation, and burden 
the wage-earner. To avoid injustice t~e matter of intensity 
of demand for consumption must be delicately handled, lest 
there should be a shifting of consumption and consequent busi-
ness disaster in certain lines of industry. Then, too, as 
regards the question of incidence, unless the tax can be 
levied specifically in some monetary unit per ordinary pack-
age of distribution, the burden of the tax will either fall 
upon the producer or he will add to his prices in a ratio that 
will bring him in undue profit to the detriment of the con-
cumer. 
Taxes on gross receipts of certain corporations: 
In 1862 taxes were levied on the 
following corporations at the given percentages against their 
gross receipts: steam railroads and steam-boats, toll-bridges, 
and advertisement agencies, 3%; ferry boats, and railroads 
ogher than steam, 1-1/2%; insurance companies, 1%. The rail-
road and ferry charges were on gross receipts from passenger 
service; the insurance company charges were only on marine 
and inland policies. In 1863 the freight receipts of ferry boats 
were added, as was accident insurance; and express companies 
came within the law with a rate of 2% on total business. The 
e Act of June 30, 1864 made a general revision of the taxes~in 
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this class, and levied the following: steam railroads and 
steam-boats, canals and canal boats, ships, barges, and 
stage-coaches, and other railroads, on passenger, mail, and 
~reight receipts, 2-1/2%; ferry boats, toll-bridges and roads, 
advertisements, express companies, 3%; insurance compamies, 
marine, inland, fire, and accident, 1-1/2%; lotteries, tele-
graph companies, 5%; operas, theaters, circuses, and museums, 
2%; General ~reight receipts were eliminated in 1866; and 
telegrash receipts were taxed 3% instead o~ 5%. In 1867 re-
ceipts from ferries and toll-brigges were made 2-l/2%; of 
toll-roads and advertisements were repealed. The Act of 
July 14, 1870 repealed all gross receipts taxes.-:: 
As is brought out in Seligman, 
in his Essays on Taxation,-::--::. gross receipts is at law dis-
tinguishable from income, so the two are separated for treat-
ment. But one really advantageous thing m~y be said about 
this sort of tax; it is not susceptible to ovaciorf! Gross 
receipts are easily ascertainable! However, when the 
question of tho justice of measuring t~~-~aying power on 
gross receipts, some trouble is encountered unless the 
tax is arrangpd in such a way as to be shifted onto the 
consumer in the case, not restricted to the corporation 
involved • It is v·-:ry evident that in :many bucinccses 
gross receipts do not correspond with the net profits, 
and do not,,therefore, form a just measure cf tax assessment. 
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This situation is brought out clearly by Adams, in his 
Science of Finance by the following examplet ~in the 
railroad industry, for instance- operating expenses 
average 66 per cent of operatine earnings~ From this 
it appears that only 34 per cent of gross earnings from 
operation are at till disposal of the corporation for the 
pa~nt of interest on debt, taxes, incidental betterments, 
and dividends. There are~ however, railroads in th~ 
country whose normal operating expenses are not more 
than 50 per cent of gross earnings and oth3 rs whose 
opernting expenses exceed 75 per cent of gross earnings. 
It is evident, thcrcforr., that a just assessment as 
between corporations must take into account expenses as 
well as earnings ~ . ·::-
Stamp taxes on doctunents of legal and business transactions, 
on proprietary articles and patent medicines: 
Stamp taxes on doctuoonts were 
a re w experience for this country in· the federal scheme of' 
the Civil Warf ·they were not opposed to any e:::tent, han ever, 
chie fl~r be cause their rates were not heavy enoueh to cause any 
great defection. It is ~eless to enumerate the list of 
documents taxed dnring the Civil War, for in the IDhed~e of 
the Spanish and Et..1ropea.n VTar periods a system has been worked 
out in fairly systematic shape as to what instruments of' 
transaction IlUlY best be taxed. ·::~~:: 
;".,c·i Q<"·"" 0"' ..-l. j ·,1~ 1"'"'0 I' (I' 
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January 1866 the Special Revenue Commission said, regarding 
stamp taxes: "E'o part of the revenue is probably collected 
so easily, with stiDh small expense, and with comparitively 
so :J,.ittle fra'llili, ---as that derived from stamps:• -:~-::--::· These 
facts are evident in themselves. By means of stamps the 
pel, son taxed is in a way his own collector·;- he buys the 
stamps, then collects the taxes from himself at the occasion 
of the transaction by affixing the stamp to the document 
and thereby cancelling its valuation. As far as fraud is 
concerned, the duties have :not been sufficently great as to 
tempt evasion; while, since the papers of legal and 
business transactions must be held as public evidence 
~ evasion of the proper stamping is not easily accomplished. 
As long as the unreasonable tax imposed in the Civil War 
schedule on mortgages is eliminated no real fault may be 
found vri th the general rates imposed in the experiences 
of tbe three emergency periods in this sort of taxation; 
although care s~ould be taken to avoid as far as possible 
such taxes as, though not burdensome,might be of annoyance 
or serve as an impedi:re nt to business'~. Taxes on 
proprietary articles and patent medicines , being for 
the most part slight and levied on goods eenerally con-
trolled by monopoly prices have been little opposed; their 
• only effect has been to shade off a little of the cut price 
character of the trade in the articles involved. The 
~;: .. ~;.;:- E::oc. Doc. lTo. ;:(., 30tl1. l.st. 
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productiveness of the stamp taxes may be seen in the returns 
of the sales of adhesive stamps in the Civil Tiar period, when 
from 1866-72 they produced from $14,000,000-$16,000,000 an-
nually,-:~ while the returns from Schedules A and B for the 
years 1898-1902 were, in millions of dollars, 43.8; 40.9; 
39.2; and 13.4, respectively.-::-~:. 
Special taxes on individuals and corporations ~ngaged in 
certain businesses: 
According to Howe, this class of 
tax represents a source of revenue long ago discarded by the 
oajority of the European countries as arbitrary and unjust.~:--::--:: 
The system of license duties during the Civil Uar was an ex-
tensive one; an enLtmeration of the occupations taxes, without 
a statement of the respective assessments, is sufficient to 
give an outline of the range of possibility of special taxation 
after this manner in this country. License taxes were imposed 
on the following classes during the Civil War period: apothe-
caries, architects and civil engineers, assayers, auctioneers, 
baru{s and bankers, billiard-rooms and bowling-alleys, brewers, 
cattle brokers, commercial brokers, custom-house brol{ers, 
insurance brokers, land-uarrant brokers, pawn-brokers, produce 
brokers, otock brokers, substitute brokers, builders and con-
tt tractors, general business, butchers, candle-makers, circuses, 
claim agents, compounders of liquors, confectioners, convey-
ances, retail dealers, wholesale dealers, retail liquor dealers, 
wholesale liquor dealers, tobacco dealers, dentists, coal-oil 
distillers, liquor distillers, eating-houses, e:d1ibi tions, e:{-
,...Foo',.iio·:~or. OJ~ :Lol1on5.nc; PC-DC. 
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press companies,Bift enterprises, grinders of cof.fee and spices, 
horse dealers, hotels, insurance agents, intelligence-office 
keepers, jugglers, lawyers, livery-stable keepers, lottery-
ticket dealers, general manufactu~ers, cigar, still, and tobacco 
manufacturers, patent-right dealers, peddlers, photogbaphers, 
plumbers and gas-fitters, physicians and surgeons, real estate 
agents, rectifiers, soap-makers, stallion and jack owners, 
theaters and museums, and tobacconists. The occupations taxed 
in 1898 and in 1914 have been given.~:- ~: Little need be said 
of these taxes, but that they fall directly upon the taxed 
purson or corporation, and the burden is not shifted further. 
They represent a source of large and immediate income. Of them 
Wells says: "all our revenue experience during the past five 
years has conclusively shown that, with the exception of stamps, 
there is; no class of taxes which are paid so readily and prompt-
ly collected with so little trouble and expense by the govern-
ment officials; and impede to so small a degree the industry 
and development of the country, as the so-called license taxes."-::- · .. ··.( 
The ease of collection and the cheerfulness of reception of 
these duties do not constitute a certification of their relative 
justice, however. In this regard Howe points out that "it would 
be doubtful if there is to be found a tax more tmfair to mer-
.. E::/ c. Doc .ITo.~-, -<1-Gth. 2nd. 1;)5-7. 
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cantile classes" than are these license, or special, taxes;* since 
they cannot be shifted to the consumer, they represent fixed 
and arbitrary requisitions; their weight cannot be satisfactorily 
apportioned in any branch of business, and the large competitor 
usually benefits over the small in the schedules arranged. The 
revenue 1~eturns from the special taxes for the years from 1866-70 
ranged aru1ually from 016,000,000-$25,000,000,,:uhile those of 
1898 were equally productive. 
Taxes on legacies and distributive ohares of personal property: 
A tax on legacies and distributive 
shares.of personal property was imposed in 1797 in the early 
attempts at internal tax organization.-:;.-::·. This tax was repealed 
in ll.8D2 .~:--::-·:f Again in 1862 1 an inheritance-tax provision was 
made, a t.ax on legacies and distributive shares of personal 
property, together with a probate fee in Schedule B, and a sue-
cession duty charged against each interest in re~l;p~bp~rty~* * 
The tru: was again enacted in 1898, and its provision have been 
stated.·:: -:H: It will be noticed that, in spite of the evident 
justice of inheritance taxation, the practise in this country 
has been restricted to emergency periods. ~rom an economic 
standpoint no tax is more justly levied than this; an enu.rnera-
~-. -~-~ ~-- -- - -~~ --
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heritance Tax Law. The cost and collection is not high nor diffi-
cult; fraud is not easy; receipts are distributed through the 
year, retul"ns a1~e fail"ly constant; and the income is elastic 
and may be increased i~nediately with an increase in rate. Since 
the returns from the inheritance-taxation are not considerable 
it 7lill not be treated furtheri the highest returns under the 
Civil War levy for a year uas about ~3,000,000, and under tho 
Spanish Uar levy about $5,000,000. 
Taxes on incomes: 
The only suggestion of federal 
income-t:1~mtion in this country pl"cvious to the Civil War was 
that made by Dallas in his repo1•t on the State of the Finances 
on January 17, 1815, proposed as a means of recovery from 
the financial situation of the \Tar of 1812.-:: Seligman in 
hi~ study of the Income Tax, ventures to say that "Had the 
war lasted a few months longer there is every p1~obabili ty that 
an income-tax would have been imposed."-::-:: By Act:)of A~ust 5, 
1861, a 3% tax was imposed on all incomes over $800, to be 
payable on Ol" before June 30, 1862 .~:-:m This minirnum was l"'educed 
to C600 in the bill l"'epOl"'ted into the House by the Uays and 
1.l:eans Committee on 1'.1:arch 3, 1862; and the Ac:b,as passecl,provided 
for a 3% tax on incomes from $600-$10,000; 5% on incomes over 
$10,000; repealed the previous~:.income-ta:: provision, providing 
payments on June 30, 1863 and for three years thereafter.-::· -::· 
In his report of November, 1863,-::- -::--:: the Cornr .. lissioner of Inter-
I ·1c o :·-.c ~t~:-.. ::: > • /~.;3 c . 
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~ nal Revenue suggested that more progressive rates should be 
made, and when the Act of June 30, 1864 was passed, the rates 
wel"e set as follows: on incomes from $GOO-~~s,ooo, 5,%; $5,000-
$10,000, 7-1/2%; over Olo,ooo, 10%. Before this law went into 
effect it was superseded by the law of Harch 3, 1865, which 
changed the rates to 5% on incomes from ~G00-$5,000, 10% over 
$5,000. By Act or :March 2, 1867, the rainimum ilas raised to 
~1,000 and a general r•ate of 5% was imposed. By Act of July 14, 
1870, the minimum was raised to $2,000 and the general rate 
changed to 2-1/2%; provision was made for the Act to expire 
after two yeaPs. 
Receipts from the Civil War 
income-tn~ were as follows:.;: 
Under Act of July 1, 1862: 
3% on ~600-$lo,ooo-----------------------1363-5---$17,814,170 
5% n ~10, 000 up--------------------··---- " 11 16,494,961 
Under Act of March 3, 1865: 
5% on ~G00-$5,000------------------------1865-7--- 58,078,597 
10% " ~5,000 up-------------------------- " "~-- 60,851,011 
Under Act of i·riarch 2, 1867: 
5% on $1,000 up--------------------------1068-1--- 04,848,692 
Under Act of July 14, 1870: 
2-1/2% on $2,000 up-----·· ----- ... ----------1071-3--- 1.6, 097,921 
In 1864 a special income-tax of 5% on all incomes over $600 was 
~ levied·::··::· to be col1ec ted on or before October 1st, 1864; the 
returns from this special tax wer>e----------------$29,381,862 
Regarding this source of revenue , 
which uill undoubtedly form the basis of any financial scheme 
~:III.> 417. 
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of futur•e emergency, the lesson learnt has been that time is 
necessary for the production of the maximum of return under 
income-tax assessment. This is clearly shovvn in the record of 
increasing return from this source in succeeding years. As far 
as administration was concerned, the tax was successfully operated 
during the period of hostilities, but in the later years, with 
raised exemptions and less restrictive conditions of collection, 
fraud and evasion became common ·::- A discussion of the theory 
• 
of income-t~x is irrelevant here, but the very productive nature 
of the duty commends it to recognition as the ideal source 
for this country to turn to in the case of the rise of emereency 
conditions in the future. The mistal{es made in the Civil War 
period in this relation:have been surnnarized by Seligman to 
comprise the following: mistakes in theory, defective provioions, 
exaggerated exemptions, and inadequate administrative methods.~:-:~ 
None of these deficiencies, however, const±tute an argument 
contrary to the efficacy of the income-tax in itself as an appro-
priate and advantageous source of federal revenue in time of · 
crisis. 
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IV. 
CONCLUSION. 
Regarding federal taxation in times of emergency: 
Certain general conclusions may be 
formulated with reference to the arrangement of an emergency 
scheme of taxation, such as VTould be availed of in the case of 
future financial crisis in our conntl"'Y. Taxation is the sound-
est source of government income, and it. should he pressed in 
time of fiscal emercency to the limit of acceptability. In de tel"'-
mining what particular taxes shall be incorporated into the 
emergency revenue law: careful consideration must be given 
especially to the qualifications of economy and practicability 
of collection, ultimate incidence, effect on industry, equality 
in distribution of the additional burden, acceptability and 
productiveness. In the first place, it seems that the policy 
adppted in the early tax experiences of the Civil War, of dis-
tributing lou rates over an enormous number of taxable sources, 
is an unwise policy, leading to confusion, needlessly 2:0ing out 
of the way to secure uni vel"Bali ty of the burden, endansering 
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a just manipulation of the instruments of taxation by promoting 
intricateness, and extending unduly the federal expenses of tax 
collection. Direct taxes are more desireable under conditions of 
em.ergency than indirect ta:~es. The emergency call for revenue 
should not be taken advantage of for the effecting of other pur-
poses, as was the case of the tariff manipulation of the Civil 
War. Additional revenue is best gotten by quiclc strokes of direct 
application on the sources of revenue, and if the effect of the 
sudden sacrifice may remain there at the source of the revenue 
and not be bonnded off into the channels of industry and corr~erco, 
~ then conditions are most favorable for a quick recovery from 
the emergency state when the pressure is once loosed again. A 
treasury emergency is invariably accompanied by at least a tem-
porary industrial and commercial unsettlement, and those taxes 
calculated least to aggravate the strained relations in those 
respects are the taxes best fitted for a place in the emergency 
financial schene to be adopted in tine of national danger. 
The ultimate resting place of the 
burden of any given tax should be clearly determined before the 
levy. It is impor•tant that the rates should be calculated with 
accuracy and intelligence that no uncalled for injustice should 
(; fall upon ei thor the producer OI' the constuner. "?lhatever taxes 
arc levied to fall on the consumer should be so reckoned as to 
strike the unit of the comr.J.odity most common in distribution, 
(; 
and the levy on that unit of consumption should be in some 
appropt•iate and integral monetary unit that can be added to 
the previous price, without profit or loss to the retail 
dealer; E.G., the assiglLment of a tax of 1/2d. per 1/2pt. 
on beer in the fb•st "i'Tar BudGet, 1914, Great Britain. 
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That the burden of the emergency 
ta..~ation, as eovel.,ned by the incidence of the sevePal taxes 
imposed under the scheme, should be universally distributed, 
is a fact too evident to be discussed. The manner in i7hich 
this universality is to be secured may, however, be considered 
briefly. Basing an argument on the assumption of the prominence 
of the part to be played by the income-tax in the emergency 
scheme of the future, it may be anticipated that the problem 
of future financiers will be that of finding a t~~, the levy-
ing of which will serve to offset the burden of the income-
tax, and to place on the shoulders of that class which, by 
reason of the exemption minimum characteristic of income-ta~~ legis-
lation, escape its provisions, an equal share of the new burden 
of expenditure. A part of this general burden will be distributed, 
it may be assumed, by additions made to the excise system already 
in force. In addition, if, as uas the case in the present crisis 
in England, there remains the "elusive teetotaler" still to be 
cared for, then the example set by Great Britain might be fol-
lowed: that of imposing an additional customs duty on some 
I ~ ' 
' 
0 
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purely revenue article of common consumption among that class 
of individ~als. There has been a tendency in the last two emer-
gency schemes to concentrate the new duties on articles and 
products, such as are consumed almost exclusively by certain 
classes, and to leave others absolutely free from the additional 
tax burden precipitated by the state of war. 
As far as the acceptability of 
particular classes of taxes are concerned, the conclusion first 
reached is, of cotwse, that the rates of existing tru~es should 
. 
be increased, to provide additional revenue without involving 
C. any extensive change in the administrative methods or organ-
isation currently in force. The present internal revenue systeo 
of the United States is such as may be considerably extended with-
out disadvantage to production; this was proven in the working -
out of the Bpanish War plan of taxat,ion. At that time, moreover, 
it will be recalled, one very productive current group of taxes 
was left untouc'hed and was l"eserved for more pressing emergency. 
That was the spirits group. Almost our entire internal revenue 
schedule is made up of taxes on commodities, the consumption of 
which is what is technically known as intense, that is, the con-
sumption nay be expected to be comparatively constant regardless 
() of the tru::-rato or changes in prices. This being the case, the 
present schedules stand capable of considerable extension, with-
out commensurate danger of a falling off in the volume of tax-
I 
I 
t I 
I 
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able business. 
At the present time this elastic 
fund of current taxes is reinforced by the income-tax law and 
administrative force, the limits of the productivity of which 
may only be measured by future tests of its capacity. Income-
taxation increases have formed the back-ground of the extraordinary 
taxation provisions made by Great Britain as a part of her method 
of financing the present war. The cl1ange in rates of an income-tax 
currently in force may be easily accomplished, and the new revenue 
collected without perceptible alteration in the administrative 
organisa~ion. Income-ta~r.ation provides an appropriate instrument, 
as has been above-Dtated, for the collection of revenue from a 
distinctive class of the population, and thereby lays a basis for 
an equable distribution of the balance of the burden by supplementary 
taxes. Income-taxation, probably less than any other form of 
tax except inheritance-taxation, may be said to exercise the least 
interference with industrial and commercial relations. 
There has, during the present war, 
appeared a new kind of tax, which, because of its evident justice 
should be prominently displayed in an organisation of new resources 
for meetine war expenses, that is, the tax on war profits. In Eng-
land such a tax is being imposed on all trades, manufactures, con-
cerns in the nature of trade or business, whose profits for any 
businesn year of account ending within the war period c:::ceod those 
of the pre-war period by over 100 pounds, the ta1:: heine so% on all 
ru naa&&&Z£ii!Ls:uas&&a u-L!tu 
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ouch extra profits. As sources of immediate revenue, not greatly 
cumbersome to industry and comDerce, the usual stamp taxes and 
special taxes will be readily imposed again, when needed. The 
inheritance-tax, though unimportant from a fiscal point of 
view, may always be deemed a just and appropriate tax. The place 
of the tariff in an emergency scheme must, necessarily, be an 
insignificant one, the customs rates being changed only to counter-
balance the effect of the internal revenue increases on domestic 
producers. The imposition of a new import duty upon purely revenue 
articles mic;ht be resorted to, as an attempt at indirect taxation 
~ of the people at large. Direct taxes are ruled out from further 
practise, because of the inequality incurred by the general rule 
of the Constitution, restricting their assessment to the propor-
tiona of population enumeration. In conclusion, it may be said, 
that the tax. resoUl"'Ces of the United States are boundless, that 
the willingness of the people of this country to accept tax 
burdens in time of national danGer has become proverbial after 
the past experiences in emergency situations, and that the present 
system of the United States represents an ideal potential source 
of income to meet any ordinary fiscal crisis that might arise 
in the near future. 
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